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ABSTRACT 
 Since 1996 approximately 5.4 million citizens of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC) have lost their lives as a result of the humanitarian crisis currently going 
on. Various warring ethnic groups have been committing terrible crimes against 
international law. War crimes and crimes against humanity such as rape, murder, 
recruitment of child soldiers and indiscriminate attacks on the civilian population have 
caused unspeakable suffering to civilians, especially in the eastern part of the country.  
 Domestic institutions, the judiciary and the prosecution department, have not 
been able to address impunity because of being either in a state of total collapse or too 
weak to confront the strong warlords. As a result, when the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) became operational on 1 July 2002, the DRC authorities revived their desire to 
address the atrocities. Consequently, the crimes were referred to the ICC in 2004 and 
three DRC citizens are now undergoing trials at the ICC in two cases. 
 The first part of this study evaluates the historical events that led to the referral 
of the DRC situation to the ICC. This includes the background of the conflict and the 
extent to which international crimes have been committed. Both regional and domestic 
attempts and initiatives to address the conflict are discussed, with specific reference to 
peace agreements and restorative justice mechanisms. The second part of the study deals 
with the prosecution of the perpetrators by the ICC. It examines the approach of the Pre-
Trial Chamber to two legal issues, the principle of complementarity and modes of 
criminal participation as part of the ICC Statute. In this regard, the study makes a critical 
evaluation of two preliminary decisions confirming the charges against Lubanga, 
Katanga and Chui before the cases proceeded to the trial stage. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
 
1.1 Introduction to the Study 
 The current corpus of international criminal law overlaps two other full-fledged 
branches of international law, the international humanitarian law and human rights law. 
Both humanitarian and human rights law impose obligations on states in respect of 
certain types of conduct and standards. International criminal law imposes obligations 
on an individual and, on that account, creates individual criminal liability.1 The focus on 
the individual as the subject of international law was, for the first time, witnessed in the 
Nuremberg Judgment of 1945.2 The judgment not only lifted the veil of state 
sovereignty but rebutted the traditional view that only states could be held responsible 
under international law.3 Accordingly, any commission of crimes under international 
law is attributed to the individual perpetrator and not his or her state.4  These crimes are 
classified into four categories as war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and the 
crime of aggression.5 It is on this basis that the International Criminal Court (hereafter 
“the ICC”) is prosecuting individuals indicted for crimes allegedly committed in the 
                                                 
1 Cassese (2008: 3). 
2 IMT, Judgment of 1 October 1946, in The Trial of German Major War Criminals, Proceedings of the 
International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany, Part 22 (hereafter “Nuremberg 
Judgment”). 
3 The Judgment enforced the provisions of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 
(hereinafter “Nuremberg Charter”) of 8 August 1945. Article 6 of the Charter established individual 
criminal responsibility for crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity which were 
committed by the Axis Powers during the Second World War. For a detailed discussion on the 
revolutionary achievements of the Nuremberg Charter and the judgment, see Tomuschat (2006: 830 et 
seq.) and Sadat (2007: 491 et seq.). 
4 Nuremberg Judgment, p. 447. 
5 See Cassese (2008: 12). 
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Democratic Republic of the Congo (hereafter “the DRC”) during the ongoing armed 
conflict.  
 
1.2 Background to the Study 
 It is the interest of the international community that impunity for crimes against 
international law is put to an end. Such crimes transcend state boundaries and, 
consequently, pose a threat to the peace, security and well-being of the entire world.6 
The ICC is one of the avenues which can address this impunity at international level. 
One of the ways in which the ICC’s jurisdiction can be invoked is through referral of the 
events suggestive of commission of the crimes (technically called “a situation”) to the 
ICC for prosecution.7 The referral can be done by a state party to the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court (hereafter “the ICC Statute”).8  
 Before the official referral of the situation in the DRC, the Prosecutor of the ICC 
(hereafter “the Prosecutor”) had received complaints from both individuals and non-
governmental organizations. The complaints called his attention to war crimes and 
crimes against humanity that were allegedly being committed in that country.9 On the 
basis of these complaints, in July 2003, the Office of the Prosecutor announced that it 
would keenly follow-up the allegations, as the Prosecutor wanted to make the situation a 
                                                 
6 See para. 3 of the Preamble to the Rome Statute for the Establishment of the International Criminal 
Court; also see Werle (2009: 29-30). 
7 See ICC Statute, Art. 13.  
8 ICC Statute, Art. 13(a) read intandem with Art. 14(1). ICC’s jurisdiction can also be triggered under 
Article 13(b) of the Statute by referral of the situation by the United Nations Security Council when acting 
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations or by the ICC Prosecutor using the proprio motu 
powers under Art. 15 of the ICC Statute. 
9 See ICC press release dated 19 April 2004 at <http://www.icc-cpi-
int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/> (accessed on 8 March 2010). 
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priority.10 Subsequently, in September 2003, the Prosecutor informed the Assembly of 
States Parties at its second session that he might be forced to seek consent of the ICC to 
start an investigation using his proprio motu powers vested in him under the ICC 
Statute.11 He, however, thought that a voluntary referral by the DRC authorities would 
guarantee his office an active support and facilitate its work.12 
On 3 March 2004, the DRC government, acting under Article 14 of the ICC 
Statute, referred the situation in the DRC to the Prosecutor in respect of crimes allegedly 
committed anywhere in the DRC since 1 July 2002. In this referral, the DRC 
government asked the Prosecutor to investigate the situation in order to determine if one 
or more persons should be charged with such crimes.13 On 23 June 2006, the Prosecutor 
made the decision that he would open investigations in the interest of justice and the 
victims.14 Subsequently, on 5 July 2006, the situation in the DRC was officially 
assigned to the Pre-Trial Chamber (hereafter “the PTC”).15 The ICC has, so far, issued 
four warrants of arrest against Thomas Lubanga (2006),16 Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui 
(2007),17 Germain Katanga (2007)18 and Bosco Ntaganda (2006).19 Until now, (October 
                                                 
10 See the press release in note 9 above. 
11 See the press release in note 9 above. 
12 See report of the second session of Assembly of ICC’s states parties available at 
<http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/asp/second.htm> (accessed on 8 March 2010). 
13 See the press release in note 9 above. 
14 See the ICC press release dated 23 June 2004 at <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/> (accessed on 8 March 2010). 
15 Decision Assigning the Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo to Pre-Trial Chamber I 
(categorized as Public Document) at <http://www.legal-tools.org/en/doc/218294/> (accessed on 16 March 
2010). 
16 Prosecutor V Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Warranr of Arrest), available at 
<http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/Court%20Documents/ICC/Lubanga-Warrant-of-arrest.pdf> 
(accessed on 16 March 2010) (hereafter “Lubanga Case-warrant of Arrest”). 
17 Prosecutor v.Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Warrant of Arrest) available at 
<http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/Court%20Documents/ICC/Ngudjolo_warrant-arrest.pdf>  
(accessed on 16 March 2010). 
18 Prosecutor v Germain Katanga (Warrant of Arrest), available at 
<http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/Court%20Documents/ICC/Katanga-
Warrant%20of%20arrest.pdf> (accessed on 16 March 2010). 
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2010) three of the accused persons are in detention and one is still at large.20 The PTC 
conducted a preliminary hearing of evidence in order to determine if the prosecution has 
sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to hold them criminally 
responsible.21 The PTC confirmed the charges in 2009,22 and trials for war crimes and 
crimes against humanity are now sub judice before the Trial Chamber (hereafter “the 
TC”).23 
 
1.3 Objectives of the Study 
 The study takes three important facts into consideration: first, the armed conflict in 
the DRC started in 1996 while the ICC’s jurisdiction is limited to cover the conflict only 
from 1 July 2002;24 secondly, the trials derived from the DRC situation mark the first 
two cases since the inception of the ICC, hence they are the yardsticks for the 
application of the ICC Statute since its adoption; and thirdly, the decisions of the PTC 
confirming the charges indicate that the Court will function differently from its 
predecessor ad hoc Tribunals namely, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(hereafter “the ICTR”) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
                                                                                                                                               
19 See Prosecutor v Bosco Ntaganda (Warrant of Arrest), available at 
<http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/Court%20Documents/ICC/Ntaganda%2C-Warrant-of-
Arrest.pdf> (accessed on 16 March 2010). 
20 Thomas Lubanga, Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui are in custody while Bosco Ntaganda 
is still at large. 
21 This procedural requirement is provided under Art. 61 of the ICC Statute. See its explanation in chapter 
three of this study. 
22 See Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui (Confirmation of Charges), ICC Pre-
Trial Chamber decision of 30 December 2008 (hereafter Katanga and Chui Case (Confirmation of 
Charges) and Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga (Confirmation of Charges), ICC Pre-Trial Chamber decision 
of 29 January 2007 (hereafter Lubanga Case (Confirmation of Charges). 
23 Trials commenced against Lubanga on 26 January 2009 and against Katanga and Chui jointly on 24 
November 2009. 
24 ICC Statute, Art. 126. The article limits the jurisdiction ratione temporis of the ICC to commencing on 
or after the date the Statute entered into force on 1 July 2002. 
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Yugoslavia (hereafter “the ICTY”). Basing on these factors, the aims of this study are to 
trace the origins and factual background of the DRC conflict and the attempted peace 
process; to discuss two specific legal issues arising from the PTC's decision on 
confirmation of the charges namely, the complementarity nature of the ICC and modes 
of participation leading to individual criminal responsibility; and lastly, to consider the 
foreseeable possible contribution of the two cases to the development of the future 
jurisprudence of the ICC. 
 
1.4 Literature Survey 
 A lot has been written about the history of the conflict in the DRC. There is also a 
substantial body of literature on the application of the ICC Statute and the functioning of 
the Court itself. Of particular relevance to this study is the discussion on the 
complementarity of the ICC vis-a-vis the domestic jurisdiction of states and the modes 
of criminal participation that form the basis of individual criminal responsibility.  
 The available literature indicates that the background to conflict in the DRC 
cannot be divorced from some historical, external and internal factors. Such factors link 
directly to the control of natural resources, especially the minerals and the natural forests 
in the northern and eastern part of the DRC. This natural wealth has not only sparked the 
proliferation of internal rebel groups, but has also been used as a source of finance to the 
conflict itself and as loot by external forces supporting the rebels. As a result, the rebel 
groups have remained as the sources and propagators of ethnic clashes in the area.25 The 
                                                 
25 See Pottier (2003) at <ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/Meeting/009/ae515e.pdf> (accessed on 11 March 
2010); also see Human Rights Watch (2003) at <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2003/07/07/covered-
blood> (accessed on11 March 2010). 
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commission of international crimes against the civilian population is shown to be 
directly linked to these factors, ranging from the use of child soldiers and sexual 
violence to other horrific crimes.26  
 Ntalaja27, Gondola28 and Turner29 in their separate works, ably, give an in-depth 
history of the Congo and the origins of the conflict as it ensues from the colonial era. 
They paint a complete picture of the crimes incidental to the conflict and assess the 
peace process attempts. The relevance of their works to this study is only in creating an 
understanding of the factual background of the conflict. This is because they incline 
more to the history of the grievances and the causes of the conflict without addressing 
the need for punishment for the crimes committed in the course of the conflict. Savage 
and Kambala,30 on their part, contend that while the ICC's intervention has got an 
impact, though a limited one, the domestic prosecutions are incapable, inchoate and 
inadequate to address the atrocities. They, as an alternative to the ICC, argue for a 
hybrid court as an ideal break-through, drawing an analogy from the Special Court of 
Sierra Leone. Their work, though very current, does not give any consideration on the 
current proceedings at the ICC and any impact such proceedings might have on the 
                                                 
26 See United Nations Security Council (2007) at 
<http://www.adhgeneva.ch/RULAC/pdf_state/DRC.SGreportchildrenAC.2007.pdf> (accessed on13 
March 2010); Amnesty International (2004) at <http://www.amnesty-
eu.org/static/documents/DRC_main.pdf> (accessed 13 March 2010); UN report on independence of 
judges and lawyers (2008) at  <http://www.adh-
geneva.ch/RULAC/pdf_state/DRC.HRC.violence.womenandchildren.pdf> (accessed on 14 March 2010); 
UN report on the human rights of the internally displaced persons (2008) at 
<http://www.adhgeneva.ch/RULAC/pdf_state/DRC.SituationofHR.HRC2008.pdf> (accessed on 13 
March 2010); UN report on violence against women (2008) at <http://www.adh-
geneva.ch/RULAC/pdf_state/DRC.HRC.violence.womenandchildren.pdf> (accessed on 14 March 2010). 
27 Ntalaja (2002). 
28 Gondola (2002). 
29 Turner (2007). 
30 Savage and Kambala (2008) 
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conflict. In other studies like Kawimbi,31 Vanspuwen and Savage,32 restorative justice 
mechanisms like a truth commission and traditional mechanisms of dispute settlement 
have been considered as being useful in the DRC where the formal domestic retributive 
justice mechanisms are inadequate. However the learned authors do not discuss 
prosecutions by the ICC as an important and impactful component of the retributive 
justice in complementing any domestic criminal prosecutions. 
 The literature also indicates that the entertainment of the DRC cases at the ICC 
was, as a matter of principle, dependent on the complementarity principle. This principle 
gives the ICC only a secondary jurisdiction making it a complementary forum for 
retributive justice. This being the case, the ICC lacked original jurisdiction over the 
crimes perpetrated in the DRC which were primarily under the original jurisdiction of 
the DRC courts or national courts of other states parties to the ICC Statute.33 Benvenuti 
and Latanzi point out that this arrangement  could save three important goals, namely, to 
respect DRC’s original jurisdiction and sovereignty, to avoid ineffectiveness of the ICC 
due to overload and lastly, to discourage the DRC and other national courts from 
avoiding their primary responsibility in repressing international crimes. Thus before the 
ICC assumes jurisdiction, it must be assured that it is really justified.34 Some other 
works entail a doubt as to whether, in view of the complementarity principle, it is 
possible for a case to be referred back to the national criminal jurisdiction after it has 
been declared admissible by the ICC, especially when there have been changes on the 
                                                 
31 Kawimbi (2008) 
32 Savage and Vanspauwen (2008). 
33 Ofei (2008) at <http://www.up.ac.za/dspace/bitstream/2263/8094/1/ofei.pdf> (accessed on 16 March 
2010). 
34 Benvenuti (1999); Latanzi (1999). 
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ground that have impacted on the state's inability or unwillingness, as some authors 
claim to have been the case in the DRC.35  
 The works in the preceding paragraph entail a controversy because there is a 
disagreement among the authors as to whether, in the case of the DRC, the 
complementarity principle was met before the cases could be admitted. The 
disagreement is on whether there was any unwillingness or inability to prosecute on the 
part of the DRC in order to justify the admissibility of the cases by the PTC. Some of 
the authors argue that there were indicators to show that the judiciary in the DRC had 
made a positive step to regain its ability to prosecute and, in fact, charges had been laid 
against Lubanga in the domestic courts. ElZeidy, for instance, argues that the ICC 
assumed the jurisdiction out of desperation, as it was underemployed.36 This study 
critically addresses this issue and gives the author’s position on this controversy.  
 When the admissibility of the case has been confirmed, the prosecution must 
establish the perpetrator's individual criminal responsibility. This must be determined by 
considering the manner in which the accused person participated in the commission of 
crime.37 Some of the works referred above were written before the CC assumed 
jurisdiction over any case. Therefore, they are only speculative of how the Court would 
approach the modes of criminal participation, and some derived their inferences from 
the ICTR and ICTY. In contrast, this study is not speculative. It addresses the subject 
directly from the reasoning of the ICC itself in its first two cases, noting that the ICC has 
                                                 
35 Kleffner (2008); ElZeidy (2008). 
36 El Zeidy (2008). 
37 Werle (2009: 165 et seq.); Cassese (2008: 187 et seq.). 
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expressly ruled out any mechanical transfer of precedents from the ad hoc Tribunals to 
its system.38 
 In establishing the factual background of the conflict and the situation in general, 
the study relies much on the resolutions of both the United Nations General Assembly 
and the Security Council on the DRC and the books by Gondola, Ntalaja and Turner. On 
the legal considerations, apart from the ICC Statute, the study draws much from Werle's 
Principles of International Criminal Law39 and Cassese's International Criminal Law.40 
Indeed, the two decisions of the PTC on confirmation of charges against Kabanga, Chui 
and Katanga form the core points of reference from which the issues emanate and on 
which the arguments are centered. 
 
1.5 Hypothesis 
 The study is based upon the assumption that, the self-referral of the situation in the 
DRC is a result of the DRC's inability or unwillingness to investigate, prosecute and 
punish the perpetrators of the crimes under international law. 
 
1.6 Research Methodology 
 This study was conducted as a desktop research. It relied on the library and the 
internet for primary and secondary information. Primary information was obtained 
mainly from the web pages of the ICC and other organizations dealing with human 
rights, international criminal law and transitional justice issues. Also, the two decisions 
                                                 
38 See Katanga and Chui Case (Confirmation of Charges), para. 508. 
39 Werle (2009: 165 et seq.). 
40 Cassese (2008: 187 et seq.). 
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of the PTC confirming the charges for Lubanga, Chui and Katanga were largely used. 
Books, journal articles and newspapers were used as sources of secondary information. 
 
1.7 Overview of Chapters 
 This study is presented in five chapters. Chapter one carries the general 
introduction. Chapter two lays the historical framework and factual background of the 
conflict in the DRC. It traces its historical origins, participants and effects. It briefly 
explores the efforts to restore peace and reconciliation which were attempted before and 
after the referral of the DRC situation to the ICC. Chapter three bears a discussion on 
the notion of confirmation of charges under the ICC Statute. It highlights the material 
facts of the two DRC cases which were confirmed by the PTC. Chapter four is devoted 
to the consideration of the legal issues which ensued from the PTC’ decisions on the 
confirmation of charges. It particularly addresses PTC’s approaches about admissibility 
of the DRC cases and the modes of criminal participation.  Chapter Five concludes the 
study. It embodies some observation on the lessons from the two DRC cases, 
particularly their possible future relevance in the jurisprudence of the ICC. It also 
contains the author’s recommendations based on the findings of the study. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE DRC 
CONFLICT 
 
2.1 Introductory Remarks 
 The armed conflict in the DRC has been in existence since 1996. It has, so far, 
claimed the lives of 5.4 million people, including about 50 thousand civilians in Ituri 
district alone.41 Children under the age of five account for about 50% of this number. On 
average, 5% of these deaths are a direct result of the conflict, while the rest are caused 
by malnutrition and communicable diseases as indirect consequences of the conflict.42 
Consequently, the conflict is regarded as the most deadly armed conflict in terms of 
deaths of civilians since the Second World War.43 The violence has internally displaced 
thousands of civilians and caused a total collapse of important services.44 At one point in 
time, at least nine countries have been directly involved in the conflict, thus giving it an 
international dimension. Domestically, there has been a proliferation of warring ethnic 
militia groups, some of which are breakaways from the existing ones, thus giving the 
conflict its ethnic element. The conflict has resulted in complete fragmentation of the 
DRC politically, economically, socially and territorially. In order to fully comprehend 
the source and the nature of the atrocities committed in the DRC, and generally, the 
                                                 
41 See report of the International Rescue Committee (2008) at 
<http://www.theirc.org/sites/default/files/resource-file/IRCDRCMortalityFacts.pdf> 
(accessed on 6 May 2010) (hereafter “IRC report”); also see report of the Amnesty International (2006) at 
<http://www.crin.org/resources/infoDetail.asp?ID=7774&flag=news> (accessed on 16 March 2010). 
42  See IRC report (note 41 above). 
43 See Amnesty International report (note 41 above). 
44 See IRC report (note 41 above). 
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situation as referred to the ICC, this chapter gives, albeit briefly, the complete picture of 
the conflict as rooted in the DRC's leadership history. 
 
2.2 Historical Roots of the Conflict 
2.2.1 Colonialism and Ethnicity 
 The current DRC is ethnically divided into 250 linguistically related groups.45 
This resulted from the partition of Africa in 1884-1885 among the European powers, 
which was done by arbitrary demarcation of territorial boundaries. Some of these ethnic 
groups found themselves split across the boundaries, including the Tutsi and Hutu who 
are found in the DRC, Rwanda and Burundi.46 The DRC was placed under Belgian 
colonialists. Due to its natural resources, the Congo basin was one of the areas which 
experienced intensive scramble by the European powers. However, the over-ambitious 
king Leopold II of Belgium was able to get the area as his personal colony, having 
guaranteed the other scrambling powers free navigation in the Congo River.47 He thus 
assumed his arbitrary control over the DRC in 1885 without the DRC people being 
consulted.48 Violations of the rights of the people living in the Congo started in this 
period in the form of heinous inhumane acts whose consequences have been described 
as the “first holocaust” of the Congolese people.49 From 1908, the Belgian Parliament 
snatched the colony from the king and placed it under effective rule of the elected 
                                                 
45 Ntalaja (2002: 14-15). 
46 Ntalaja (2002: 14-15). 
47 Ntalaja (2002: 14-15). 
48 Ntalaja (2002: 8). 
49 Estimate of the death toll resulting from the inhumane acts of the Belgians was 10 million. The acts 
were committed in a widespread manner and included forced labour. The villagers who failed to meet 
their daily quotas of production were subject to arson, bodily mutilation, rape and murder. See Ntalaja 
(2002: 22-23). 
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Belgian government.50 This did not have any significant difference to the lives of the 
people of the Congo. 
 From 1920, the German colonies of Rwanda and Burundi were given to 
Belgium. From this time the Belgians resorted to the system of indirect rule, which used 
African chiefs as day to day overseers of their effective control.51 The system 
strengthened existing ethnic divisions, using the chiefs as popular puppets, and 
eventually, accorded different treatment to each group. Further, the country was divided 
into provinces and sub-regions to simplify exploitation of the abundant natural resources 
and minimize resistance.52 This system of ethnic division had deadly consequences in 
the post-colonial DRC as its features clearly manifest themselves in the ongoing 
conflict. Currently, in eastern DRC, for instance, the rebel groups, organized along the 
lines of Hema, Ngiti or Lendu ethnic origins are fighting one another with the view of 
each ethnic group dominating a portion of the natural resources in the area.53  
 
2.2.2 First Congo Republic (1960 - 1965): A Ray of Hope? 
 The Belgian Congo got its independence on 30 June 1960, following an election 
in which a nationalist movement, the Mouvement National Congolais, MNC, under 
Patrice Lumumba, won and formed the government. Lumumba became the first 
executive Prime Minister of the independent multiparty state, while Joseph Kasavubu of 
                                                 
50 Ntalaja (2002: 24). 
51 Belgian occupation over Rwanda and Burundi was confirmed under the League of Nations' mandate in 
1919 when the two states were removed from Germans' occupation by the Versailles Treaty of 1919. The 
system of indirect rule was copied from the Germans who were using it in these two former colonies. See 
Turner (2007: 28). 
52 Turner (2007: 28). 
53 See Human Rights Watch, (2003: 5 et seq.). 
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the Alliance des Bakongo (ABAKO) was elected by the Parliament as President.54 A 
leadership crisis started shortly after independence, when the president dismissed Patrice 
Lumumba from office on 5 September 1960, a measure which was objected by 
Lumumba as being unconstitutional.55 At the same time, a mutiny happened in the 
Katanga province which necessitated the intervention of the UN.56 The crises worsened 
when Lumumba was kidnapped and assassinated on 17 January 1961 by the rebels in the 
Katanga province, who were allegedly assisted by Belgium and the United States of 
America (the USA).57  Amidst this confusion and chaos, four short-lived weak 
governments succeeded one another between 1961 and 1965.58 
 
2.2.3 Dictatorship Regime (1965 - 1997) 
 In 1965, Mobutu Sese Seko, who was chief of staff of the new army, led a coup 
which overthrew president Kasavubu. The Parliament, in an extraordinary session, 
approved him through a vote of confidence.59 Both the Parliament and the people 
thought that this new regime would bring political and economic stability after the 
chaotic beginning of the first independent government.60 The new regime got 
recognition by the international community, particularly, the Organization of African 
                                                 
54 See this at <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic_Republic_of_the_Congo#cite_ref-11> (accessed 
on 8 May 2010). 
55 Young (1966: 34). 
56 Turner (2007: 32-33). 
57 Turner (2007: 32-33). 
58 Turner (2007: 32-33). 
59 Gondola (2002: 133). 
60 Gondola (2002: 133). 
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Unity (OAU).61 The regime also enjoyed an absolute recognition, support and protection 
of the USA and the western European countries, who regarded Mobutu as the best ally 
in their fight against communism, as opposed to Lumumba whom they had categorized 
as a communist.62 Mobutu abused this support and turned the government into a 
totalitarian regime. He started by stripping the Parliament of most of its legislative 
powers in March 1966, before suspending it for two months. Then, in May 1966, 
through a presidential Decree, he assumed “full powers” and abolished the office of the 
Prime Minister, thus making himself the head of both state and government.63 
 This regime was in power for 32 years. In these three decades, Mobutu 
embarked on leadership by terror in which political opponents were either co-opted or 
repressed.64 Political assassinations, torture, betrayals and arbitrary execution of 
opponents were used as tools to consolidate power.65 The economy was completely 
ruined by personal accumulation of wealth which was conducted through massive 
plunder of the national resources.66 This abuse of power has a direct link to the current 
conflict as it triggered grievances and wars of opposition explained below. 
 
                                                 
61 For example, Mobutu was invited to attend the OAU summit convened in Kenya in 1966 and was 
assured political and economic ties by the East and Central African states in 1967. See Gondola (2002: 
134-135). 
62 See Hochschild (2001: 287-288); Turner (2007: 32); Hartung and Moix (2000) at 
<http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/congo.htm> (accessed on 8 May 2010). The authors 
indicate that the USA prolonged the rule of the Zairian dictator, Mobutu, by providing more than $300 
million in weapons and $100 million in military training. 
63 Gondola (2002: 135). 
64 Gondola (2002: 135). 
65 Gondola (2002: 135). The author refers, among other things, to the arrest of the former Prime Minister, 
Evariste Kimba and other three cabinet ministers, on grounds of conspiracy to overthrow the government 
and assassinate Mobutu. Their trial by the military court took ten minutes only, and all were sentenced to 
death by hanging. They were publicly executed before 50,000 spectators. The first Republic leaders, 
including the overthrown President, were detained, murdered, exiled, internally deported or confined to 
their home villages. 
66 Mobutu plundered about $ 4 billion which was discovered in Swiss banks and other European countries 
after his overthrow. See Hochschild (2001: 288). 
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2.3 The Current Conflict 
2.3.1 First Congo War (November 1996 - May 1997) 
 The fall of communism, which marked the end of the cold war in 1989, came as 
a blow to the dictatorship regime in which western allies lost interest. Mobutu's intimacy 
with his god-fathers in the western bloc was rendered obsolete, despite the honour he 
had previously enjoyed from them. Pressure for democratization mounted from different 
sides, including the former allies. The dictator would not easily succumb to the pressure 
for democratic transition from both internal and international sources, although his 
control started to weaken.67 This, however, did not stop the efforts to end the 
dictatorship by all means, thus the first Congo war. 
 The war was sparked by the emergence of anti-Mobutu groups, mobilized on 
ethnic grounds and organized into several dissidents and minority groups in Goma and 
Kivu. They formed a grand anti-Mobutu coalition, the Alliance of Democratic Forces 
for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (in French, Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour 
la Liberation du Congo-Zaiire, AFDL).68 The ADFL, led by Laurent Kabila jointly with 
a Rwandan Tutsi militia group based in Congo, the Banyamulenge, supported by 
Rwanda and Uganda, overthrew the dictatorship regime.69 In May 1997 the AFDL 
                                                 
67 See this at <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Congo_War> (accessed on 8 May 2010). 
68 Members of this coalition included the People's Revolutionary Party (Parti de la Révolution populaire, 
PRP) under Laurent Kabila, the National Resistance Council for Democracy (Counseil national de 
résistance pour ladèmocratie, CNRD), the Democratic Alliance of the Peoples (Alliance democratique de 
peoples, ADP) and the Revolutionary Movement for Liberation of Zaire (Mouvement révolutionnaire 
pour la liberation du Zaire, MRLZ). See Turner (2007: 4). 
69 Rwandan president alleged that his Country planned and directed the rebellion for security purposes. 
Alleging the same reason, Angola backed the ADFL from 1997 to stop Mobutu’s regime from supporting 
the UNITA rebels. See Turner (2007: 5). 
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seized power and Kabila, who became the de facto President, formed the government 
and rewarded the Rwandan Tutsis with high ranking posts in the DRC army.70  
 
2.3.2 Second Congo War (1998 - 2002) 
 Both the people in the DRC and the international community laboured under a 
misconception that the new government would avoid the atrocities committed by its 
predecessor regime. However, democratic reform became a myth. Kabila showed all 
signs of one-man's rule: he postponed the reform and centralized executive, legislative 
and military power in his office, and military courts could now try politically active 
civilians.71 No respect was given for human rights, since “cruel, inhumane and 
degrading treatment, torture … and … execution became widespread.”72 The new 
regime suppressed political opposition, the press, civic groupings and the human rights 
organizations present in the DRC.73 The country fell into the second war from May 1998 
to 2002.74 The unexpected removal of the Rwandan Tutsis from their positions in the 
army was perceived by the former allies as a betrayal. As a result, alliances were 
hatched between foreign powers, specifically Rwanda and Uganda, and local groupings 
to overthrow Kabila’s government.75 Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia joined in support 
                                                 
70 Turner (2007: 5). 
71 Savage and Vanspauwen, (2008: 328). 
72 Savage and Vanspauwen, (2008: 328). 
73 Savage and Vanspauwen, (2008: 328). 
74 This war has been described as Africa's world war because of the big number of the countries involved 
and its grave consequences. See Turner (2007: 6). 
75 New rebel (anti-Kabila) groups emerged in Goma, namely, the Congolese Rally for Democracy 
(Ressemblement Congolais Pour la Democratique, RCD), backed by Rwanda and the Congo Liberation 
Movement (Mouvement de Liberation du Congo, MLC) which was backed by Uganda. This was a 
manifestation of the determination of the former allies of Kabila to replace him by a leadership which 
would safeguard their interests in DRC. See Turner (2007: 6). 
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of the DRC government, and this gave the war its multi-state character.76 The most 
affected people were civilians. The number of civilian death toll between 1998 and 2002 
is estimated to be 3 million people, and those internally displaced raised dramatically.77 
Laurent Kabila was assassinated in January 2001 and Joseph Kabila, his son, took over 
power. This war was supposedly ended by the signing of a peace agreement in 2002.78 
However, the conflict continued in the northern and eastern parts of the DRC, 
specifically in the districts of Ituri and Kivu. Indeed, the DRC's self-referral of the 
situation to the ICC and the Prosecutor's investigations are in respect of atrocities which 
were mostly committed subsequent to the signing of this particular peace agreement. 
 
2.3.3 Participation of Foreign States: State Responsibility  
 The participation of foreign states in the DRC conflict breached their 
international obligations. Under public international law, it is against the principles of 
sovereignty and territorial integrity for a foreign state to interfere in the internal affairs 
of another state uninvited. Both the backing of the DRC rebels by Uganda and its 
presence in the territory of the DRC were declared by the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) to have contravened these novel principles and, on this basis, the DRC was granted 
reparations.79 The DRC government also accused Uganda for violation of human rights 
                                                 
76 Savage and Vanspauwen, (2008: 328) 
77 Olsson and Fors (2004: 321). 
78 The Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo signed in 
Pretoria on 16 December 2002. 
79 See Case Concerning the Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo (the Democratic Republic of 
Congo v. Uganda), ICJ Judgment of 19 December 2005, available at 
<http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/116/10455.pdf>  (accessed on 11 May 2010) (hereafter DRC V 
Uganda (Judgment); For a commentary on this judgment see  Tzatzaki (2008: 235). 
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and International Humanitarian Law on the territory of the DRC.80 On this claim, the 
ICJ ruled that Uganda was, at one point in time, the occupying power in Ituri district - a 
fact which placed it under all the obligations of an occupying power under the Hague 
Regulations of 1907.81 The ICJ also was called upon to declare Burundi and Rwanda's 
presence in the DRC to be manifestly unlawful and in contravention to international law 
on the same grounds.82 The ICJ, however, operates at states level, and hence, does not 
attribute responsibility to individuals. Its findings on the existence of grave violation of 
human rights and humanitarian law in the DRC do not hold the individual perpetrators 
responsible, although they serve as a clear indication that some individual criminal 
responsibility exists. Thus, impunity was never addressed by the ICJ and the violations 
continued.  
 
2.3.4 Why the Conflict? 
 The nature of the conflicts in the DRC has been influenced by the various 
motives of the parties involved. Both wars have been described as civil wars; 
international conflicts designed to overthrow a dictatorship; a continuation of the 1994 
Rwandan Hutu-Tutsi conflict, pursued on the DRC soil; war over resources; and wars of 
                                                 
80 See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Cong (The Democratic republic of Congo v. Uganda): 
Application instituting the proceeding filed on 23 June 1999, p. 5, available at <http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/116/7151.pdf>, (accessed on 12 May 2010). 
81 DRC V Uganda (Judgment), paras. 178-180. 
82 On Rwanda, see Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New application: 2002) (The 
Democratic Republic of Congo v. Rwanda): Application instituting the proceeding filed on 23 June 1999, 
available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/117/7071.pdf> (accessed on 12 May 2010); also see  
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New application:2002) (The Democratic republic of 
Congo v. Rwanda): Jurisdiction and the Admissibility of the case: ICJ Judgment of 3 February 2006, 
available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/126/10435.pdf> (accessed on 12 May 2010); On Burundi, 
see Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New application:2002) (The Democratic republic of 
Congo v. Burundi): Application instituting the proceeding filed on 23 June 1999, available at 
<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/115/7127.pdf>  (accessed on 12 May 2010). 
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self defence with reference to Rwanda, Uganda and Angola.83 Obviously, the motive of 
the first war which led to a domestic rebellion was the removal of the dictator. The 
persistence of the conflict in the eastern part is clearly both a resource and an ethnic war. 
The mutual murder between Lema and Lendu in Ituri district has been described as 
purely tribal and ethnic, but in reality, it also revolves around the control of gold and 
other natural resources in the area.84 Rwanda, Angola and Uganda claimed to have 
security reasons, namely, to stop insurgent groups which were based on the DRC soil 
and allegedly backed by the Mobutu regime.85 This argument is valid only as far as the 
first war was concerned, when Mobutu was still in power. Uganda’s and Rwanda's 
continued involvement in the DRC conflict from 1998 is largely for economic reasons 
i.e. to plunder the resources of the DRC.86 Both Uganda and Rwanda are reported to 
have made super profits from illegal business activities, especially trade in gold, coltan, 
diamonds and timber plundered in the areas they controlled.87 Meredith gives an 
explanation of how each participant has been fishing in the troubled waters: 
Like vultures picking over a carcass, all sides were engaged in a scramble 
for the spoils of war. The Congo imbroglio became not only self-financing 
but highly profitable for the elite groups of army officers, politicians and 
                                                 
83 Turner (2007: 8). 
84 Turner (2007: 8). 
85 Rwanda justified its presence in the DRC as being to fight the Hutu militia group (Interahamwe) which 
comprised the perpetrators of the 1994 genocide who allegedly had sought refuge in the DRC, thereby 
launching attacks on Rwanda from there. Uganda and Angola claimed to be fighting the LRA and the 
UNITA rebels respectively, who were launching attacks from the territory of the DRC. See Ericksen 
(2005:1098-1107); also see Anteserre (2006: 6). 
86 Turner 82007: 8). 
87 Rwanda and Uganda recorded increase in exports of these minerals since 1998, although there was no 
any evidence of domestic production. Profit from the war for Rwanda was estimated to be USD 250 
million for the year 1999 only. Annual production of gold in Uganda rose from 0.0015 to 11.45 tons 
between 1994 and 2000 without any significant domestic production. For this observation and more 
information on the plunder of DRC resources see Olsson and Fors (2004: 326); Hochschild (2001: 288); 
and Ericksen (2005: 1098-1107). 
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businessmen exploiting it…For their part, Rwanda and Uganda, having 
failed to dislodge [Laurent] Kabila from Kinshasa, turned the eastern 
Congo into their own fiefdom, plundering it for gold diamonds, timber, 
coltan, coffee, cattle, cars and other valuable goods.88 
It is, for this reason, correct to argue that the fighting groups in the DRC are also 
motivated, apart from ethnicity, by greed and grievances, deeply rooted in the politics of 
the time in both the DRC itself and the neighbouring states.89 
 
2.3.5 Nature of the Conflict 
 It is confusing whether the armed conflict in the DRC is of an international or 
non-international character. The confusion is hinged on the involvement of foreign 
countries in the conflict supporting either the rebels or the government of the DRC, 
although, on its face, the conflict appears domestic. In this regard, the ICJ concluded 
that the conflict in the DRC was of an international character, because of Uganda's 
occupation of Kibali-Ituri province which it created within the DRC in 1999 and 
installed its own military administration.90 The PTC has also ruled that the conflict 
acquired its international character in Ituri district from July 2002 to 2 June 2003, when 
Uganda was the occupying power,91 and resumed a non-international character from 2 
June 2003 to December 2003.92 At this juncture, it can be concluded that, with regard to 
its nature, the conflict in the DRC is a mixed armed conflict.  
 
                                                 
88 Meredith (2005: 540). 
89 Olsson and Fors (2004: 322). 
90 The DRC v. Uganda (Judgment), paras. 173-176. 
91 Lubanga Case (Confirmation of Charges), para. 220. 
92 Lubanga Case (Confirmation of Charges), paras. 227-237. 
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2.4 Attempted Peace Process  
 Both regional and international organizations embarked on an attempt to restore 
peace in the DRC in 1999. Representatives of the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), the OAU, the UN, the states parties to the conflict and rebel 
leaders met in Lusaka from 29 June to 7 July 1999 and agreed on a ceasefire 
agreement.93 
 
2.4.1 The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (1999) 
 The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was the initial process to end the second 
Congo war. It was signed on 10 July 1999 by the DRC, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, 
Uganda and Zimbabwe.94 In the agreement, the parties agreed on three important pillars: 
a stop to hostilities and procedures for the withdrawal of foreign troops;95 neutralization 
of armed groups operating in the DRC;96 and establishment of a rapid Inter-Congolese 
Dialogue, ICD which would, inter alia, facilitate the formation of a government of 
national unity as an interim measure toward democratic elections. They also agreed on 
the integration of the rebels into the Congolese army.97 Despite signing the ceasefire 
agreement, Rwanda and Uganda did not withdraw their troops. They agreed to do that 
on condition that the DRC government should show its commitment to participation in 
                                                 
93 International Crisis Group (2001: 1) (hereafter “ICG African Report”). In this agreement, the UN, 
OAU, SADC and Zambia signed as witnesses. 
94 See article 1 of Chapter 1 of annex A which provides for the modalities for the implementation of the 
ceasefire. 
95 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, Art. 12; also see Annex B to the same Agreement which provides for the 
modalities for the withdrawal of the foreign forces. 
96 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, Art. 22. 
97 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, Arts. 19 and 20. 
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the dialogue and security matters.98 Rwandan troops remained in the DRC until 2002 
when another separate bilateral peace agreement, the Pretoria Peace Accord, was signed 
by which the DRC committed itself to destroying the Interahamwe militias attacking 
Rwanda from its soil.99 The Inter-Congolese Dialogue, on its part, did not take off 
immediately for lack of political will on the side of President Laurent Kabila, who 
claimed to have no confidence in the OAU mediator, Sir Ketumile Masire.100 Thus, the 
peace process remained at a standstill until the dialogue started again at a snail's pace 
after Kabila's assassination in January 2001. 
 
2.4.2 The Inter-Congolese Dialogue: Kick off 
 When Joseph Kabila came into power in 2001, he showed his willingness to 
revive the Inter-Congolese Dialogue.101 Before it started, the parties met for 
reaffirmation equal status of all signatories of the LCA and signing of the ‘Declaration 
of Fundamental Principles of the Inter-Congolese Political Negotiations’,102 which 
restated the terms of the dialogue.103 A preliminary meeting was called in Gaborone.104 
The delegates agreed on two basic things, an immediate and unconditional withdrawal 
of foreign troops and the signing of a "Republican Pact" reaffirming national unity, 
                                                 
98 ICG African Report p. 2.  
99 Peace Agreement between the Governments of the Republic of Rwanda and the DRC on the Withdrawal 
of the Rwandan Troops from the Territory of the DRC and the Dismantling of the Ex-FAR and 
Interahamwe Forces in the DRC, available at 
<http://www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/drc_rwanda_pa07302002.pdf> 
(accessed on 18 May 2010). 
100 ICG African report, p. 2. 
101 ICG African report, p. 3. 
102 "Declaration des principes fondamentaux desnégotiations politiques inter-congolaises", Lusaka, 4 
May 2001. 
103 ICG Africa report, p. 4. 
104 These included delegates from the DRC government, armed rebel groups of RCD and MCL, civil 
society, unarmed political opposition and the dissident factions of the RCD and MLC. As required by Art. 
5(2)(a) of Annex A to the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. 
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integrity and sovereignty.105 The second meeting for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue was 
scheduled in Addis Ababa in October 2002. However, before the meeting in Addis 
Ababa, there emerged a signing of separate treaties between the major parties outside 
the ICD.106 This indicated that, the parties had some pre-conceived positions even before 
the dialogue. As a result, the Addis Ababa meeting failed to move the dialogue an 
inch.107 The remedial meetings scheduled in Addis Ababa could not take place due to 
financial constraints.108 South Africa unilaterally intervened by offering to partly 
sponsor the dialogue.109 
 
2.4.3 Transitional Government 
 The Inter-Congolese Dialogue reached what seemed to be a tremendous 
achievement with the signing of the Global and Inclusive Agreement in Pretoria on 17 
December 2002 (hereafter “Pretoria Agreement”), in which the parties agreed on the 
structure of the transitional institutions, namely, the executive, the legislature and the 
army.110 The so-called “1+4 formula” was adopted to accommodate the major parties in 
the conflict.111 The agreement was confirmed on 2 April 2003 when participants in the 
Inter-Congolese Dialogue signed the 'Final Act of the inter-Congolese Political 
                                                 
105 ICG Africa Report pp. 5-7. 
106 E.g. the RCD-Goma and the MLC met in Goma in a meeting attended by Rwanda and Uganda in order 
to “co-ordinate” the positions of the parties before the meeting. The Goma meeting called for vacation of 
all political positions, including the presidency of the DRC, before the dialogue continued. See Rupiya 
and Boshoff (2003: 32-33). 
107 Rupiya and Boshoff (2003: 32-33). 
108 Rupiya and Boshoff (2003: 32-33). 
109 Rupiya and Boshoff (2003: 35). 
110 See The Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
signed in Pretoria on 16 December 2002, at 
<http://www.iss.co.za/AF/profiles/drcongo/cdreader/bin/6global.pdf> (accessed on 18 May 2010).                   
111 According to '1 + 4' formula, the transition would be led by an interim president as head of state and 
supreme commander of the armed forces and four vice-presidents. See Smis and Trefon (2003: 672). 
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Negotiations' in Sun City (hereafter “Sun City Agreement”).112 The Agreement provided 
that Kabila should remain the transitional President to be assisted by four Vice 
Presidents, one from each of the participating groups - the DRC government, the RCD-
Goma, the MLC and the non-armed political opposition.113 A transitional Constitution 
was drafted to incorporate this arrangement.114 The new constitution was adopted in 
January 2006, followed by democratic elections in July 2006 which marked the end of 
the political transition, with Kabila winning the presidency.115 However, the conflict 
continued in the north-eastern part of the country. 
  
2.5 Violation of International Criminal Law 
 Throughout the conflict, there has been widespread and systematic violation of 
international criminal law. Civilians have been the main victims of the atrocities 
committed by the warring sides. For example, the ICJ confirmed that there were 
violations committed by the Ugandan People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) and its allies 
from 1999. These include murder, torture and other forms of inhumane treatment of 
civilian population, destruction of villages and civilian buildings, failure to distinguish 
between civilian and military targets and to protect civilian population when fighting 
with other combatants, training of child soldiers and failure to take measures to respect 
human rights and international humanitarian law in the occupied territories.116 
Combatants from the Congolese army and the militia groups, have been attacking, 
                                                 
112 Smis and Trefon (2003: 672). 
113 Pretoria Agreement, Art. II. 
114 See the draft constitution at <http://www.chr.up.ac.za/hr_docs/constitutions/docs/DRC.pdf> (accessed 
18 May 2010). 
115 VoA (2006). 
116 The DRC v. Uganda (ICJ Judgment), para. 211. 
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murdering and raping civilians, including the Nyabyondo massacre in December 
2004.117 There are also various reports of international organizations documenting 
commission of terrific international crimes against civilians.118 The conflict and the 
violations continued even after the Pretoria Agreement which was supposed to end the 
conflict, and this has remained a big concern of the Security Council.119 
 
2.6 Dealing with the Past 
 Throughout the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, the main focus was to bring the 
conflict to an end. As a result, prosecution of serious violations of humanitarian law and 
human rights law was never addressed adequately. In order for the fragile transition 
process to go smoothly, no one was held accountable for the breach of international 
law.120 The negotiators placed more emphasis on the restorative justice, which never 
addressed impunity. After the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, the following transitional 
justice mechanisms were attempted, but no significant achievement has been recorded. 
 
 
 
                                                 
117 Savage (2008: 331-333). On recruitment of child soldiers, see Thomas Lubanga case (Confirmation of 
Charges), para. 267. 
118  Human Rights Commission (2000), at 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/87cbe9be9dc541db802568b300561be2?Open
document> (accessed on 21 June 2010); Report on the UN mission in the DRC of 2000, at 
<http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2000/sgrep00.htm> (accessed on 21 June 2010). This report 
concluded that Rwandan and Ugandan armed forces “should be held accountable for the loss of life and 
the property damage they inflicted on the civilian population of Kisangani”.       
119 The Security Council has expressed its concern over the continuing violations even after the conclusion 
of the peace process in 2002. See for example, the following Security Council Resolutions: S/RES/1468 
(2003); S/RES/1555 (2004); S/RES/1565 (2004); S/RES/1592 (2005); S/RES/1596 (2005); 
S/RES/1621(2005); S/RES/1649(2005) and S/RES/1799 (2008). 
120 Vanspauwen and Savage (2008: 397). 
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2.6.1 Amnesty Laws 
 The first provision on amnesty was in the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, whereby 
the parties to the agreement were given freedom to grant amnesty to members of their 
armed groups present in the DRC.121 The amnesty would not cover the crime of 
genocide, if committed.122 This means, therefore, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity could be covered by the amnesty, if granted. It is not clear why the amnesty 
clause excluded only genocide which was not as evident as war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. The Pretoria Agreement, as well, contained a provision which 
provided that the transitional government should grant amnesty for “acts of war, 
political and opinion breaches of law”, but excluded the crimes of genocide, war crimes 
and crimes against humanity.123 This provision was included in Article 199 of the 
Transitional Constitution and promulgated by a Presidential Decree in 2003 and by an 
Act of Parliament in 2005.124 In an attempt to stop the violence which continued in the 
eastern part of the country, the DRC government signed another amnesty law to benefit 
a rebel group, the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) in 2009.125 
This law granted amnesty to Congolese citizens living in the DRC or abroad for acts of 
war and insurrection committed in the provinces of North and South Kivu since 2003 to 
the date of the signing of the law.126 This amnesty, as well, did not apply to the core 
                                                 
121 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, Art. 22.  
122 Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, Art. 22. 
123 Pretoria Agreement, Art. III(8). Further, the article provided that, as an interim measure pending the 
adoption and promulgation of the amnesty law by the Parliament, the law would be promulgated by a 
Presidential Decree.  
124 Presidential Decree No. 03-001 of 2003 and Law No. 05/023 of 2005. The amnesty granted covered 
crimes committed between 1996 to June 20, 2003. 
125 B.B.C (2009). 
126 Section 1. 
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crimes of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.127 The exclusion of core 
crimes from the scope of the amnesty laws clearly indicates the recognition, by both the 
negotiators and the DRC, of the obligation to investigate, prosecute and punish the 
crimes. However, the mere exclusion, without effectively prosecuting the crimes cannot 
be said to address impunity. 
 
2.6.2 Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
 The Pretoria Agreement and the subsequent transitional constitution listed the 
Commission Vérité et Réconciliation (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, hereafter 
“TRC”) as one of the institutions to support democracy.128 The TRC was established on 
4 April 2003.129 Its mission was to establish truth and promote peace, justice, reparation, 
forgiveness and reconciliation.130 However, the commission has failed to investigate 
human rights violations and instead has only done some few conciliation activities. Its 
failure, which was admitted by its chairperson, was due its long investigation timeframe 
(40 years), budget deficiencies, bad composition and limited mandate.131 At this 
juncture, it must be noted that investigations and proceedings of a truth commission, 
however good its composition or mandate, do not meet the standard required under 
international law, nor do they replace the state’s duty or the role of the national courts in 
prosecuting international law crimes. However, depending on the fragility of the 
situation, some regard can be given to the work of a TRC if it is internationally accepted 
                                                 
127 Section 3. 
128 Pretoria Agreement, Article. 4(a); also see the Transitional Constitution, Articles 154-160. 
129 Law No. 04/018 of 30 July 2004. 
130 Savage and Kambala (2008: 346); also, see United State Institute of Peace website at 
<http://www.usip.org/resources/truth_commissions_democratic_republic_congo> (accessed on 17 May 
2010).  
131 Savage and Kambala (2002: 346-348). 
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as being genuine and more suitable at the time. This could be the case, for instance, 
where it can only grant a conditional amnesty or it is mandated to commit those whose 
crimes meet certain threshold of gravity to normal courts for trial. In the case of the 
DRC this cannot be said to have been the case. The TRC did not even commence any 
investigations. Consequently, it was not able to respond to the atrocities committed, and 
did not address impunity in any way. 
 
2.7  Intervention of the ICC 
 The failure of the above domestic mechanisms to address impunity necessitated 
the intervention of the ICC in 2004, after the referral of the situation to it by the DRC.132 
Even before the self-referral by the DRC government, the Prosecutor had already 
decided to investigate the situation in the DRC, as a reaction to the atrocities which were 
being committed,133 and his office had expressly stated that the DRC conflict was “the 
most urgent situation to be followed”.134 The self-referral, however, was more welcome 
because the Prosecutor had indicated that the referral would ensure his office a higher 
level of co-operation from the DRC.135 This materialized with the signing of the 
provisional memorandum of understanding on privileges and immunities to facilitate the 
activities of the ICC on the DRC territory,136 pending DRC’s ratification of the 
                                                 
132 See Letter of Joseph Kabila to the Prosecutor of 3 March 2004 para. 2, at <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/cases/ICC-01-04-01-06-39-AnxB1_French.pdf> (accessed on 26 May 2010). 
133 Moreno-Ocampo (2006: 9). 
134 ICC Prosecutor as quoted in the American Coalition for the International Criminal Court, ACICC 
(2006: 6) (hereafter “ACICC Paper”). 
135 Mareno-Ocampo (2006: 9). 
136 The Provisional Memorandum of Understanding on the Privileges and Immunities between the 
International Criminal Court and the Democratic Republic of Congo, available at 
<http://www.icccpi.int/menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/2004/provisional%20memor
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Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the ICC (APIC).137 In the following 
chapters, this study deals with the conflict at the level of the ICC.  
 
2.8 Concluding Remarks 
 In this chapter, the study has traced the origin of the conflict in the DRC. It has 
been shown that, although the current conflict started in 1996, it cannot be divorced 
from the country's leadership history prior to that period. The motivating factors for the 
conflict have been shown to be greed and grievances deeply rooted in the DRC itself 
and the surrounding states. The conflict, classified as having international and non-
international character, entails both state and individual responsibility. The violations 
continue despite the signing of the peace agreements and coming into power of the 
democratic government. The transitional justice measures attempted domestically, 
including the formation of the TRC and the exclusion of the core crimes from the scope 
of the amnesty provisions, have not addressed impunity by holding the perpetrators 
accountable. As a result, the situation was referred to the ICC in 2004 in order to fill the 
impunity gap created by domestic mechanisms. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
andum%20of%20understanding%20on%20the%20privileges%20and%20immunities%20between%20the
%20international%20c> (accessed on 31 August 2010)  
137 See the Memorandum of understanding, (note 136 above). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
AN OVERVIEW OF A CONFIRMATION HEARING UNDER ICC STATUTE 
WITH BEARING ON THE DRC CASES 
 
3.1 Introductory Remarks 
 As stated earlier, the objective of this study is to deal with two important aspects 
as regards the DRC conflict. The first aspect of the conflict, the factual background of 
the conflict, has been dealt with in the preceding chapter. The second aspect, to evaluate 
some specific legal aspects of the first two cases arising from the conflict, is dealt with 
in the next chapter. Particularly, the second objective is to deal with the cases at their 
pre-trial (preliminary) stage by evaluating the decisions by the PTC on confirmation of 
the charges. In this regard, the current chapter sets the foundation for a better 
understanding of the essence of chapter four which is the one that deals with the issues 
arising from these two decisions. To achieve this aim, this chapter outlines the meaning 
of the notion of confirmation of charges as required by the ICC Statute and traces its 
legal basis under the relevant provisions of the Statute. Secondly, it gives the material 
facts on the basis of which the PTC confirmed the charges. Thirdly, from the facts of the 
two cases, the nature of the charges is discussed and the relationship between the two 
cases manifests itself at this stage. 
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3.2 Notion of Confirmation of Charges 
3.2.1 Meaning of Confirmation Hearing 
 Confirmation of charges in the DRC cases was regulated under article 61 of the 
ICC Statute. This is the first procedure that must be followed by the PTC within a 
reasonable time after the accused person is arrested or makes a voluntary appearance 
before the ICC.138 It should be noted that, a hearing for confirmation of charges is 
limited in scope and purpose and is neither a trial nor a mini-trial.139 Although the ICC 
Statute requires that both the Prosecutor and the person charged or his counsel be 
present, no pleadings take place at this stage.140 At the hearing, the Prosecutor is obliged 
to present the charges against the accused person and argue in support of each 
charge/crime he alleges.141 The aim of this hearing is for the PTC to assess the charges 
against the available evidence and decide whether or not the case merits going further 
for trial.142 It does not, at this stage, go into the merits of the case to establish the 
innocence or guilt of the accused person.143 At the confirmation stage, the ICC Statute 
sets the evidentiary value to be below that of beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution 
is required to present evidence which can only establish “substantial grounds to believe” 
that the person charged committed the crimes.144 The accused person at this stage is 
                                                 
138 ICC Statute, Art. 61(1). 
139 Katanga and Chui case (Confirmation of Charges), para. 64. 
140 See note 139 above. Note that a confirmation hearing may be done ex parte in circumstances set out 
under Art. 61(2). This happens when there is a waiver on the part of the accused person of his or her right 
to be present, or when all reasonable steps to secure his appearance have failed. 
141 ICC Statute, Art. 61(4). 
142 This process is equivalent to indictment in common law whose aim is to ensure that before the trial 
commences,  prosecution have a prima fascie case so that time and resources of the court are not misused, 
and the rights of the accused person are defended against a case which may not be founded. See Katanga 
and Chui case (Confirmation of Charges), para.63; also see the article by the AMICC available at 
http://www.amicc.org/docs/KatangaNgudjolo.pdf> (accessed on 27 August 2010). 
143 Katanga and Chui case (Confirmation of Charges), para. 63. 
144 Katanga and Chui case (Confirmation of Charges), paras. 62-63.  
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entitled to all the other rights of a fair trial besides legal representation. Thus, the 
accused person must be availed with the document containing the charges, the evidence 
to be presented against him/her and other disclosures that the PTC deems fit to issue.145 
The accused person is allowed to object to the charges, challenge the evidence presented 
by the Prosecutor and present his own evidence against confirmation of the charges 
against him or her.146  
 
3.2.2 Outcome of a Confirmation Hearing 
 A confirmation hearing may result in one of the two outcomes: the charges may 
be confirmed on the basis of the evidence adduced, in which case the accused person 
will be committed to the TC for actual trial;147 or the charges may not be confirmed for 
lack of sufficient evidence required under article 61(5),148 thereby, the accused person is 
released.149 In the two DRC cases, the PTC confirmed the charges against the accused 
persons on the basis of the facts and the preliminary evidence adduced by the 
Prosecutor. These facts are set out below. 
 
3.3 Material Facts for Confirmation in DRC Cases 
3.3.1 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo 
 Thomas Lubanga was the leader of a militia group (predominantly of Hema 
ethnicity) called the Union des Patriots Congolais (UPC), later renamed as the Union 
                                                 
145 ICC Statute, Art. 61(3). 
146 ICC Statute, Art. 61(6). 
147 ICC Statute, Art. 61(7)(a). 
148 ICC Statute, Art. 61(7)(b). However, the Prosecutor may subsequently reinstitute the charges for 
confirmation if sufficient evidence is obtained. 
149 ICC Statute, Art. 61(10) 
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des Patriots Congolais/Réconciliation et Paix (UPC/RP).150 From September 2002 and 
throughout 2003 he was the Commander-in-Chief of the UPC's armed military wing 
called the Forces Patriotiques pour la Liberation du Congo (FPLC), which took control 
of Bunia and some parts of Ituri district in August 2002.151 He and other militia leaders 
were arrested by Congolese authorities following the murder, on 25 March 2005, of 9 
UN peacekeepers of Pakistani origin.152 He was indefinitely held in Kinshasa, as it was 
not certain whether a Congolese court or an international tribunal would try him.153 
While under detention, the Office of the Prosecutor had opened investigations in Ituri 
region, since June 2004. The Prosecutor then applied for an arrest warrant against him, 
which was issued under seal on 10 February 2006, and unsealed on 17 March 2006.154 
He was transferred to the ICC for confirmation of the charges against him before he 
could be tried. He was indicted for crimes under article 8(2)(e)(vii) of the ICC Statute, 
namely, war crimes of conscripting and enlisting children under the age of 15  into the 
FLPC, and using them to participate actively in the hostilities in Ituri, form September 
2002 to 13 August 2003, both in the context of international and internal armed 
conflict.155 He was charged under article 25(3)(a) of the Statute, as a co-perpetrator, for 
jointly committing the crimes with other FPLC officers and UPC members.156 The 
charges were confirmed as preferred. 
 
 
                                                 
150Thomas Lubanga Case (Confirmation of Charges), para. 8. 
151 Thomas Lubanga Case (Confirmation of Charges), para. 8. 
152 Musila (2009: 21).  
153 Musila (2009: 21). 
154 Lubanga Case (Confirmation of Charges) para. 16. 
155 Lubanga Case (Confirmation of Charges), para. 9. 
156 Lubanga Case (Confirmation of Charges), para. 9. 
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3.3.2 Prosecutor v Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui 
 Germain Katanga was a top commander of a militia group (predominantly of 
Ngiti ethnicity) called the Force de Résistance Patriotique en Ituri (“the FRPI”).157 
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui was also a military leader of a different militia group 
(predominantly of Lendu ethnicity) known as the Front des Nationalistes et 
Intégrationnistes (the FNI).158 Both groups were based in Ituri district in eastern DRC. 
In 2002, the two commanders organized their groups as FRPI and FNI, to jointly fight 
the Lubanga’s UPC and its military wing, the FPLC in Ituri.159 The two leaders were 
jointly charged with several war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly 
committed between 2002 and 2004,160 during the attack on Bogoro village, on 24 
February 2003, where 200 civilians were murdered.161 The charges as they appear in the 
decision on confirmation of the charges contain several counts as follows: 
(a) Crimes against Humanity under article 7: 
 (i) Murder - article 7(1)(a);162 
 (ii) Sexual slavery - article 7(1)(g);163 and 
 (iii) Other inhumane acts - article 7(1)(k).164 
(b) War Crimes under article 8 (in the alternative contexts of international or 
 internal armed conflict): 
 (i) Inhuman treatment - article 8(2)(ii) or 8(2)(c)(i);165 
                                                 
157 Para. 12. 
158 Para. 12. 
159 Paras. 13-14. 
160 Paras. 15-31. 
161 Paras. 15-31. 
162 Para. 20. 
163 Para. 25. 
164 Para. 22. 
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 (ii) Using children to participate actively in hostilities - article   
  8(2)(b)(xxvi) or 8(2)(e)(vii);166 
 (iii) Sexual slavery - article 8(2)(b)(xxii)  or 8(2)(e)167 
 (iv) Rape - article 8(2)(b)(xxii) or 8(2)(e)(vi);168 
 (v) Outrages upon personal dignity - article 8(2)(b)(xxi) or 8(2)(c)(ii);169 
 (vi) Intentionally directing an attack against a civilian population -  
  article 8(2)(b)(i) or 8(2)(e)(i);170 
 (vii) Pillaging - article 8(2)(b)(xvi) or 8(2)(e)(v);171 and 
 (vii) Destruction of property - article 8(2)(b)(xiii) or 8(2)(e)(xii).172 
  Initially, the confirmation proceedings against them were scheduled to be 
conducted separately. The decision for the joinder of charges was the result of the 
Prosecutor’s application. The reason being the two accused persons were both charged 
for the same crimes ensuing from the same incident i.e. the attack on Bogoro village, 
allegedly committed jointly and the same witnesses would testify.173 They are charged 
under Article 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute as (i) co-perpetrators i.e. jointly committing 
the crimes and (ii) as perpetrators of the crimes through their subordinates.174 All the 
charges, with an exception of the crime against humanity of inhumane treatment, were 
confirmed. 
                                                                                                                                               
165 Para. 23. 
166 Para. 24. 
167 Para. 26. 
168 Para. 28. 
169 Para. 29. 
170 Para. 30. 
171 Para. 31. 
172 Para. 32. 
173 Prosecutor v Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui -Decision on the Joinder of Cases against Germain Katanga and 
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber of 10 March 2008.  
174 Decision on the Joinder of Katanga nad Chui cases, paras. 33-36. 
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3.4 Relationship between the Two DRC Cases 
 The decisions on the confirmation of charges against Lubanga, Katanga and 
Chui show a close relationship between the two cases which is relevant for purposes of 
this study. First, there is a similarity centered on the charging section upon which the 
charges were confirmed. As it will be shown in the subsequent chapter, in both cases the 
PTC confirmed the charges on the basis of article 25(3)(a) which gives rise to principal 
liability for co-perpetration and perpetration-by-means, forming commission as a mode 
of participation in crime.175 According to the PTC, confirmation of the charges in both 
cases could also have been sought under articles 25(3)(b) to (d) or article 28 which 
create  forms of accessorial liability.176 Secondly, the PTC adopted the same approach 
regarding the question of admissibility of the cases before the ICC. In both cases, 
admissibility was based on a reason not expressly set out in the ICC Statute. This, for 
several reasons, has become a subject of controversy between the PTC and the parties 
during the confirmation hearing177 and, subsequently, among different academic 
scholars.178 These two issues, the confirmation of the charges under article 25(3)(a) and 
the controversial issue of admissibility are reserved for critical examination in the 
following chapter. 
 
                                                 
175 See the reasoning of the PTC in Lubanga Case (Confirmation of Charges) paras. 317 et seq. and 
Katanga and Chui case (Confirmation of Charges) paras.466 et seq. 
176 Lubanga Case (Confirmation of Charges) paras. 320-321; and Katanga and Chui case (Confirmation 
of Charges) para. 471. 
177 This led to an interlocutory appeal against the decision of the PTC. See Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. 
Germain Katanga against the Oral Decision of the Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility 
of the Case  of 25 September 2009, at 
<http://www.docstoc.com/docs/DownloadDoc.aspx?doc_id=12628401> (accessed on 29 May 2010) 
(hereafter Prosecutor v. Katanga (Interlocutory Appeal Decision). 
178 See, for instance, Arsanjani and Reisman (2005: 391 et seq.). At p. 397, the authors argue that “the 
long-term consequence of the innovative allowance of self-referrals” [on ground of inaction] may take the 
ICC into areas where the drafters of the Rome Statute had not wished to tread”. 
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3.5 Concluding Remarks 
 This chapter has discussed the notion of confirmation of charges as required 
under the ICC Statute in reference to DRC cases. It has been shown that a confirmation 
hearing is a mandatory procedure in terms of article 61 of the ICC Statute, but is not 
tantamount to a trial. It is a mere pre-trial hearing with the view of ascertaining that the 
Prosecutor has a prima fascie case i.e. a case with founded charges that merits a trial. In 
reference to the DRC cases, the PTC confirmed the charges in respect of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. As pointed out, the confirmation hearing of the DRC cases has 
indicated a close relationship between them in respect of the admissibility and modes of 
criminal participation. The next chapter evaluates the legal issues from the confirmation 
decisions. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 SPECIFIC LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS FROM THE DECISIONS OF THE 
PTC ON THE CONFIRMATION OF CHARGES AGAINST LUBANGA, 
KATANGA AND CHUI 
 
4.1 Introductory Remarks 
 This chapter discusses two important legal issues that were considered by the 
PTC in the confirmation decisions, complementarity and modes of criminal 
participation. It discusses these two issues as derived from the ICC Statute and applied 
on the DRC cases. The chapter critically discusses whether the requirements under the 
Statute were met in respect of the cases and if the PTC’s decisions applied them in a 
manner compatible to the statute. 
 
4.2 Admissibility of the DRC Cases 
4.2.1 Principle of Complementarity 
 DRC cases would not be admissible to the ICC unless it was for 
complementarity reasons. The ICC does not exercise primary jurisdiction, nor does it 
have primacy over national courts.179 It exercises jurisdiction based on the principle of 
                                                 
179 This is different from the ad hoc Tribunals which have jurisdiction over the crimes under their statutes 
as a matter of primacy over national jurisdictions. See Art. 9(2) of the ICTY Statute and Art. 8(2) of the 
ICTR Statute which, in similar wording, provide that the two Tribunals “shall have the primacy over the 
national courts” and that at any stage they may ask national courts to defer to the Tribunals' competence. 
For detailed discussion on the difference between the principles of complementarity and primacy see 
Elzeidy (2008: 403 et seq.); also Pichon (2008: 187). 
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complementarity.180 Philippe defines complementarity as “a functional principle aimed 
at granting jurisdiction to a subsidiary body when the main body fails to exercise its 
primary jurisdiction.”181 According to article 17 of the ICC Statute, the ICC can exercise 
its jurisdiction over a case only where there is unwillingness or inability to exercise 
jurisdiction on the part of states with jurisdiction. Under this principle, the ICC 
jurisdiction does not replace the national jurisdiction but supplements it. National 
jurisdictions take precedence as a rule, unless the jurisdictional states are unwilling or 
unable to genuinely carry out the investigation or prosecution.182 Therefore, 
complementarity, in this study, is based on the recognition that the DRC' exercise of 
national criminal jurisdiction over the crimes committed in its own territory was not 
only a primary right but also a duty.183 
 As it has been explained above, complementarity entails two important 
components – unwillingness and inability to genuinely carry out investigation or 
prosecution. Let us now examine each component with reference to the two DRC cases. 
 
 
 
                                                 
180 ICC Statute, Preamble para. 10 and Art. 1. They provide that the jurisdiction of the ICC shall be 
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. 
 181 Philippe (2006: 382). 
182 Werle (2009: 83, marginal no. 230). On the meaning and rationale of the complementarity nature of the 
ICC, see Blakesley (2009: 435-436); Ellis (2008: 85 et seq.); Robinson (2008: 143-148); Benvenuti 
(2008: 59 et seq.); Delmas-Martty (2008: 73 et seq.). 
183 Para.4 of the Preamble to the ICC Statute recalls that “it is the duty of every state to exercise its 
criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes”. Furthermore, both customary and 
conventional international law obligate the state in which any crimes under international law have been 
committed (the state of commission) to investigate the crimes and prosecute the perpetrators. This duty 
extends to third states as well, by way of the principle of aut dedere, aut judicare, for war crimes in an 
international armed conflict. Consequently, a third state in custody of a perpetrator(s) of war crimes in the 
territory of another state is obligated to try the perpetrator(s) itself or hand them over to a state that is 
willing to prosecute. For an extensive discussion on the duty of states to prosecute see Werle (2009: 68-
72, marginal nos. 192-202). 
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4.2.1.1 Meaning of Unwillingness to Prosecute 
 Article 17(2) of the ICC Statute contains the grounds for the determination of the 
unwillingness of a state to investigate a case or carry out prosecutions. Unwillingness 
can be inferred from the following three forms of conduct of the state. The first 
indication is where, after investigations are done, a national decision is reached not to 
prosecute or the prosecution is done but not genuinely. In these circumstances, the state 
will be deemed unwilling only if either the decision not to prosecute or the concluded 
proceedings were done to shield the person responsible from criminal responsibility.184  
In such scenario, even the principle of neb is in idem (no double jeopardy) will not apply 
if the ICC or any other jurisdictional state decides to reopen the prosecution.185 
Secondly, unwillingness can also be inferred where there have been unjustified delays in 
the proceedings of the national court which imply lack of intention to bring the 
perpetrator to justice.186 The third indication of unwillingness is where the proceedings 
were or are not being conducted independently or impartially.187 Additionally, the grant 
of an absolute amnesty in respect of the crimes may also be an indication of 
unwillingness to punish the crimes. The reason being absolute amnesties tend to 
completely bar any judicial action against the beneficiaries, terminate any ongoing 
proceedings, and/or nullify any sentence which might have been passed in respect of the 
crimes covered.188 
 
                                                 
184 ICC Statute, Art. 17(2)(a). 
185 ICC Statute, Art. 20. The principle requires that a person who has been tried by the ICC or any 
domestic court for a crime over which the ICC has jurisdiction and for which he has been convicted or 
acquitted cannot be tried again by the ICC. See Ofei (2008: 10). 
186 ICC Statute, Art. 17(2)(b). 
187 ICC Statute, Art. 17(2)(c); also see Werle (2009: 89, marginal nos. 250-251). 
188 Philippe (2006: 383). 
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4.2.1.2 Was the DRC Unwilling to Prosecute? 
 According to article 17(2) of the ICC Statute, the starting point when 
determining unwillingness is the existence of investigations or proceedings in a 
domestic court - past or present - against the alleged perpetrator. The PTC indicates that 
this existence alone is not enough: it is “a conditio sine qua non the national proceedings 
encompass both the person and the conduct which is the subject of the case before the 
ICC.”189 Although Mr. Lubanga had been arrested before being handed over to the ICC, 
the PTC observed that the arrest warrants against him did not encompass the conduct for 
which he was indicted at the ICC i.e. the offence of conscripting and enlisting children 
under the age of fifteen years into FLPC and using them to participate actively in the 
hostilities.190 Further, in relation to Katanga and Chui, no proceedings had been 
commenced in domestic courts with respect to the Bogoro attack.191 Thus, according to 
both the PTC and the AC, in the absence of any domestic proceedings which met the 
“same-person-same-conduct” test, it was not possible to refer to unwillingness in the 
case of DRC. There was no national decision not to prosecute after investigation nor 
were there any concluded or ongoing proceedings from which to infer DRC’s intention 
to shield them. So, the PTC concluded that the admissibility of the two cases cannot be 
said to have been based on unwillingness. 
 The PTC’s interpretation of article 17(2) on the need for existence of 
investigation or prosecution is welcome, and accordingly, unwillingness was not the 
                                                 
189 See Lubanga Case (Confirmation of Charges), para. 31. 
190 Mr. Lubanga had been arrested and detained in DRC pursuant to two warrants of arrest issued on 19 
March 2005 and 29 March 2005. The first warrant was based on charges of genocide and crimes against 
humanity contrary to the DRC Military Criminal Code. The second warrant charged him with crimes of 
murder, illegal detention and torture. See Lubanga Case (Confirmation of Charges) para. 33.  
191 Prosecutor v. Katanga (Interlocutory Appeal Decision), para. 52.  
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case in the DRC. This is because whether or not the DRC acted genuinely could only be 
inferred from its decision, if any, or from its conduct regarding such investigation or 
prosecution. However, the “same-conduct” test that the PTC applied, though accepted in 
the context of the Lubanga case, is an innovation which seems to be, in my view, too 
open-ended as it stands now.  For instance, in the Lubanga case the PTC applied this test 
by defining the conduct as one entailing a specific offence in the ICC Statute, i.e. 
conscripting and enlisting children into the army and using them in the hostilities. This 
is clearly defined and its boundaries are confined to the ICC Statute. However, in the 
Katanga and Chui case, the conduct which was not investigated or prosecuted was the 
“Bogoro incident”.192 As the charges show, the “Bogoro incident”, unlike the conduct in 
the Lubanga case, covered 8 individual counts, and each count, for instance murder, 
could be collective of several isolated incidents against specific victims.  As a result, the 
scope of this test is likely to be very wide as one may also think of it being extended to 
“same-victim” test. For instance, assuming the charges in respect of the Bogoro incident 
had been preferred in the domestic courts and specific individual victims were not 
covered in the investigations, could the case be admissible if the Prosecutor argued on 
the basis of the “same-victim” test? The reason being each criminal act, such as rape or 
murder, which was committed in that incident is, in principle, a separate crime, which 
could be charged as a separate count or be a case on its own.193 The author 
acknowledges the individual peculiarities of cases since each case can be judged in its 
own merits. However, since this test is liable to vagueness, we humbly submit in favour 
of the need for a more objective and clearly defined criterion or standard of the “same-
                                                 
192 Prosecutor v. Katanga (Interlocutory Appeal Decision), para. 80.   
193 See the position under common law in David (2004: 199 et seq.) at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/DeakinLRev/2004/8.html (accessed on 21 August 2010).  
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conduct test”. The reason being this test cannot conspicuously be traced in the Statute, 
and eventually, it is capable of receiving preferentially wide or narrow interpretations as 
shown above. 
 
4.2.1.3 Meaning of Inability to Prosecute 
 To determine if the state with jurisdiction is unable to prosecute, the ICC has to 
consider whether, due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national 
judicial system, the state is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and 
testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.194 In determining this, the 
ICC must consider instances such as lack of central government,195  existence of a state 
of chaos due to the conflict or crisis or public disorder leading to the collapse of national 
systems which prevents the state from discharging its duties.196 Due to this state of 
affairs, the state might have lost control over the police force or the prosecutorial 
machinery might have totally collapsed.197 Moreover, even a perfectly functioning 
national judicial system can be explained as unavailable within Article 17 (3) due to 
obstacles which are factual or legal including, for instance, an absence of an 
incorporating legislation or provision that authorizes the national courts to exercise 
jurisdiction over international crimes.198 Inability could be inferred in this case only if 
                                                 
194 ICC Statute, Art. 17(3). 
195 In this case the law enforcement mechanisms may be completely unavailable. Example of such a state 
was Somalia in 1990s after the overthrow of Sayed Bare. See Williams and Schabas (2008: 463, marginal 
no. 33); also see Ofei (2008: 9). 
196 See ICC Prosecutor’s paper on policy issues (2003: 4) (hereafter “Policy Paper”) at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/1FA7C4C6-DE5F-42B7-8B25 60AA962ED8B6/143594/030905_Policy_Paper.pdf> 
(accessed on 22 May 2010). 
197 Ofei (2008: 10). 
198 Meissner, Die Zusammenarbeit mit dem Internationalen Strafgerichtshof nach dem Römischen Statut 
86 cited in Ofei (2008: 10). 
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the absence of an incorporating legislation is, for instance, due to a legislative blockage 
of attempts to pass such a law. But if the state has not taken any initiative to have such a 
law or provision in place, thereby purporting to rely on this omission, this would, in my 
opinion, be a clear case of unwillingness. 
 
4.2.1.4 Was the DRC Unable to Prosecute? 
 As stated above, the DRC's inability to prosecute can only be established if  it is 
attributable to a total or substantial collapse in its national judicial system, investigation 
or the prosecution machinery, which, in turn, paralyzed its capacity to carry out its 
proceedings.199 When the DRC referred the situation to the ICC, it stated that it was 
unable to conduct or investigate the cases on its own.200 In his letter of referral, the DRC 
President asserted: 
En raison de la situation particulière que connaît mon pays, les autorités 
compétents ne sont malheureusement pas en mesure de mener des enquêtes sur 
les crimes mentionnés ci-dessus ni d’engager les poursuites nécessaires sans la 
participation de la Cour Pénale Internationale.201 
 It should be noted that a mere assertion by a state about its inability to 
investigate or prosecute the crimes cannot by itself be a justification for admissibility. 
                                                 
199 ICC Statute, Art. 17(3). 
200 Lubanga Case (Confirmation of Charges), para. 35. The DRC’s inability to prosecute at the time of 
referral was due to the ineffectiveness in the judiciary personnel, legal framework, policing and 
investigation and judicial infrastructure. A detailed discussion on this observation can be found in Burke-
White (2005: 575-586). 
201 Letter of Joseph Kabila to the Prosecutor dated 3 March 2004 Doc. No.ICC-01/04-01/06-39-US-
AnxB1_French para. 2, available at <http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases/ICC-01-04-01-06-39-
AnxB1_French.pdf> (accessed on 30 May 2010). Its English translation can be found as appendix 1 in 
Musila (2009: 79). It states: “because of the exceptional situation in my country, the competent authorities 
are unfortunately not capable of conducting investigations of these aforementioned crimes, nor are they 
able to conduct the necessary prosecutions without the participation of the International Criminal Court”. 
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The ICC must apply the objective criteria under the ICC Statute to decide if the 
assertion is anything to rely on. As regards the DRC, the assertion of inability to 
investigate or prosecute at the time of referral is justifiable. For instance, there were very 
few courts able to conduct trials of such magnitude, the judiciary was extremely 
understaffed and judges did not have the required knowledge for lack of adequate 
training.202 Also, the prosecution is said to have been corrupt to the extent of ‘diluting’ 
the charges by indicting serious offenders for minor offences which did not reflect the 
gravity of their conduct.203 The judiciary and the prosecution were not reliable, they 
lacked neutrality and some of their members were implicated in the same atrocities. For 
instance, the former chief prosecutor of the military tribunal was convicted of murder by 
a new tribunal and sentenced to death in October 2004.204  
 However, later, the DRC regained its ability to conduct the investigations. The 
ICC and the Prosecutor confirmed that, subsequent to the referral, the DRC’s national 
judicial system underwent significant changes which had a positive impact on its ability 
to investigate and prosecute the crimes.205 These include the opening of the Tribunal de 
Grande Instance in Bunia, the capital of Ituri district, which was able to issue two 
warrants of arrest against Thomas Lubanga for other crimes, some of which were within 
the jurisdiction of the ICC.206 Moreover, the investigative authorities were able to arrest 
Lubanga and detain him at the Centre Pententiaire et de Reeducation de Kinshasa.207 In 
view of these changes, when issuing the arrest warrant against Lubanga, the PTC 
                                                 
202 ACICC Paper, p. 11. 
203 ACICC Paper, p. 11. 
204 ACICC Paper, p. 11. 
205 Thomas Lubanga Case (Warrant of Arrest), para. 36.  
206 These were genocide, crimes against humanity including murder, illegal detention and torture. See 
Lubanga Case (Confirmation of Charges) para. 33; also see note 190 above. 
207Thomas Lubanga Case (Warrant of Arrest), para. 36. 
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concluded that the Prosecution’s general assertion of continued inability under article 
17(1)(a) to (c) and 17(3) was not correct because it did not “wholly correspond to the 
reality any longer.”208 This means, therefore, the Lubanga case and any subsequent 
cases could be rendered inadmissible on this ground as the DRC had regained its ability. 
My observation would also be supported by the AC’s observation that a case that was 
originally admissible may be rendered inadmissible by a change of circumstances and 
the arising of new facts which “negate the basis on which the case had previously been 
found admissible under article 17.”209 This notwithstanding, the PTC and the AC 
continued to hold that the two cases were admissible. 
Hitherto it is clear that the grounds for admissibility of a case to the ICC under 
article 17 of the ICC Statute were not met in respect to the DRC cases - inability or 
unwillingness did not apply. This finding, therefore, renders null the original hypothesis 
upon which this study was based. Further, this could imply two things: either (a) by 
admitting the cases, the PTC violated the complementarity principle, or (b) it had a 
justifiable ground other than those mentioned under article 17, but which was consistent 
with the complementarity principle. It is important at this point to recall the chapeau of 
article 17 which insists that when determining admissibility of a case, the ICC must 
have regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and Article 1 of the ICC Statute. These two 
provisions reiterate the complementary nature of the ICCs’ jurisdiction to the national 
criminal jurisdictions. Mindful of this requirement, the PTC admitted the two DRC 
cases on the ground of ‘inaction’.  
 
                                                 
208 Thomas Lubanga Case (Warrant of Arrest), para. 36. 
209 Prosecutor v. Katanga (Interlocutory Appeal Decision), para. 56. 
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4.2.2  Meaning of ‘Inaction’ 
 The ICC assumed jurisdiction over the two cases on the ground that no state was 
acting on them. ‘Inaction’, also referred to as ‘inactivity’, as a ground of admissibility is 
not mentioned under article 17 of the ICC Statute. It arises when no state with 
jurisdiction over the case has taken any initiative to investigate or prosecute it.”210 The 
expression “state with jurisdiction” should be understood as not to be restricted to the 
state of commission, in our case the DRC. The reason being most of the crimes charged 
in the DRC cases formed part of customary international law and were prosecutable by 
any third state under the principle of universal jurisdiction.211 The tricky question that 
one could pose is whether the ICC would be bound, for complementarity reasons, to 
refrain from admitting the DRC cases if there was a third state acting on these cases, a 
state that is not party to the ICC Statute. The answer, in my view, would depend on the 
assessment of the genuineness of the motives of that state against the spirit and intention 
of the states parties to the ICC Statute. Since this was not the case I will not dwell on 
this question any further.    
 The AC has endorsed and set the boundaries of inaction as a third ground of 
admissibility of cases before the ICC. Thus, inaction applies if: (i) at any time before or 
during the proceedings (at the ICC) no state with jurisdiction over the case carries out 
any investigations212 - this includes the same conduct test;213  or (ii) where the state with 
                                                 
210 See the AC’s ruling in Prosecutor v. Katanga (Interlocutory Appeal Decision), para 2. The AC 
endorsed “inaction” as first adopted by the PTC in the Lubanga case.  
211 This is the principle of customary international law which gives right to every state to prosecute crimes 
under international law regardless of where they took place, who the victims were or whether or not any 
link with the prosecuting state exists. For detailed discussion on the meaning and applicability of this 
principle on the crimes under the ICC Statute see Werle (2009: 62-68, marginal nos. 183-191). 
212 Prosecutor v. Katanga (Interlocutory Appeal Decision), para. 80. 
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primary jurisdiction, though it may or may not have conducted some investigations, 
makes a justifiable decision that the accused person should be prosecuted, but before the 
ICC (i.e. relinquishment of jurisdiction).214 The cases from the DRC were admitted on 
these two bases. This means that the PTC and the AC declared the cases admissible on 
grounds other than unwillingness or inability which are the only ones mentioned under 
Article 17 of the ICC Statute. Accordingly, the ICC has interpreted the ICC Statute to 
embody an additional ground for admissibility other than those under article 17 by 
which it can exercise jurisdiction.215 The logical question is whether the 
complementarity principle was adhered to. 
 
4.2.2.1 Does ‘Inaction’ Violate Complementarity? 
 There had been a disagreement as to whether admissibility on ground of 
‘inaction’ as first endorsed by the PTC is compatible with the principle of 
complementarity under article 17.216 But the decision of the AC has confirmed it as 
being part of the ICC Statute and in line with complementarity.217 The AC applied the 
                                                                                                                                               
213 Williams and Schabas (2008:  616, marginal no. 23). The PTC has also assumed jurisdiction on ground 
of inaction in the cases arising from the Uganda and Sudan situations. See the Prosecutor v Ahman Harun 
&Ali Kushayab, Decision on the Prosecution Application under article 58 (7) available at 
<http://www.iclklamberg.com/Caselaw/Sudan/HarunandKushayb/PTCI/ICC-02-05-01-07-1-
Corr_English.pdf> (accessed on 15 Octobeer 2010). The PTC pointed out that “the investigation 
undertaken by the Sudanese authorities did not encompass the same conduct which is the subject of the 
application before the Court.” Also, at para. 23 the Court said that there was no indication that Ahmad 
Harun was under any investigation nor was there any indication that any prosecution had been initiated 
against him before the national jurisdictions for any crimes relating to the situation in Darfur, Sudan; also 
see the Situation in Uganda, Warrant of Arrest for Joseph Kony, para. 37, available at <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc97185.PDF> (accessed on 15 October 2010). 
214 Prosecutor v. Katanga (Interlocutory Appeal Decision), paras. 81-82.  
215 Williams and Schabas (2008: 616, marginal no.23). 
216 Arsanjani and Reisman (2005: 391 et seq.). Particularly, at p. 397 the authors argue that “the long-term 
consequence of the innovative allowance of self-referral [on grounds of inaction] may take the ICC into 
areas where the drafters of the Rome Statute had not wished to tread”. 
217 Prosecutor v Germain Katanga, (Interlocutory appeal decision) para. 84. 
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interpretation of the principle as adopted by the group of experts218 and subscribed to by 
the Prosecutor.219 This interpretation, though not binding on the ICC,220 is welcome as it 
serves the rationale explained below: 
  First, it seeks to ensure that the ICC Statute is interpreted as a whole, and in 
doing so, its spirit, inferred from the intention of the states parties, is not defeated. 
Secondly, it takes into account that the ICC is treaty-based. Consequently, interpretation 
of the ICC Statute (Rome Treaty), like any other international treaty, is governed by the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties221 which requires that a treaty should be 
contextually construed in the light of its objective and purpose.222 The principal 
objective and purpose of the Rome Treaty is to end impunity. This is derived from the 
whole spirit of the Rome Treaty which is to ensure that “the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole do not go unpunished”.223 Thirdly, 
admissibility for inaction takes into account that the essence of the complementarity 
principle is to strike a balance between the primacy of domestic jurisdictions vis-à-vis 
the ICC and the primary goal of the ICC Statute i.e. to put an end to impunity.224 
 Accordingly, a case would be admissible for inaction in any of its two scenarios 
explained below: 
                                                 
218 Informal Expert Paper on the principle of complementarity presented to the ICC in 2003 (hereinafter 
Informal Expert Paper) paras. 17-19 as quoted in and Schabas (2008: marginal no. 22). 
219 Policy Paper, p. 4.  
220 Article 21(2) of the CC Statute provides that “[t]he Court may apply principles and rules of law as 
interpreted in its previous decisions”. Therefore, the ICC can derogate from its own precedents when 
necessary.  
221 Adopted on 23 May 1969. 
222 Vienna Convention, Art. 31(1). Also,  Art. 31(2) requires that the context of a treaty must be inferred 
from its text, the preamble and any annexes.  
223 ICC Statute, Preamble, para. 4. 
224 Prosecutor v. Katanga (Interlocutory Appeal Decision), para. 85. 
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  The first case is where no jurisdictional state has initiated any investigation. 
Thus, there is no need to examine the factors of unwillingness or inability because 
Article 17 does not apply.225 It is important to note that the ICC Statute makes it a duty 
for states to punish the crimes but does not have the power to order them to open 
investigations or conduct prosecutions domestically.226 It, therefore, cannot assume that 
declaring a case inadmissible would result in an inactive state opening investigation.227 
Where the states do not or cannot voluntarily investigate and, where necessary, 
prosecute, the ICC must be able to do that in the spirit of fighting impunity.228 The 
justification of admissibility on this ground cannot be appreciated better than in the 
following words of the Appeals Chamber: 
 The court would be unable to exercise its jurisdiction over a case as long 
as a state is theoretically willing and able to prosecute the case, even 
though the state has no intention of doing so. Thus, a potentially large 
number of cases would not be prosecuted by domestic jurisdictions or by 
the International Criminal Court. Impunity would persist unchecked and 
thousands of victims would be denied justice.229 (Emphasis added). 
                                                 
225The Prosecutor supports this ground arguing that “there is no impediment to the admissibility of a case 
before the Court where no State has initiated any investigation. There may be cases where inaction by 
States is the appropriate course of action….There may also be cases where a third State has extra-
territorial jurisdiction, but all interested parties agree that the Court has developed superior evidence and 
expertise relating to that situation, making the Court the more effective forum. In such cases there will be 
no question of “unwillingness” or “inability” under article 17. See the Policy Paper, p. 4. 
226 ICC Statute, Preamble para. 6; also see Prosecutor v. Katanga (Interlocutory Appeal Decision), para. 
86.  
227 Batros (2009: 32). 
228 Prosecutor v. Katanga (Interlocutory Appeal Decision), para. 85. 
229 Prosecutor v. Katanga (Interlocutory Appeal Decision), para. 79. 
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 The second arm of inaction is where the state’s duty to prosecute230 is read in a 
manner consistent with the obligation of aut dedere aut judicare.231 In such a scenario, 
the state is allowed to “decline to exercise jurisdiction (relinquishment of jurisdiction) in 
favour of prosecution before the ICC as a step taken to enhance the delivery of effective 
justice, and is…consistent with both the letter and the spirit of the Rome Statute. This is 
distinguishable from a failure to prosecute out of apathy or desire to protect perpetrators, 
which may properly be criticized as inconsistent with the fight against impunity”.232  
 This formulation suggests that even a state which is able or willing to prosecute 
can be allowed to relinquish its jurisdiction in favour of the ICC and still the case 
becomes admissible, provided that its motive is not to protect the perpetrators or avoid 
its duty under international law. Circumstances which may necessitate this situation may 
include: (i) where there is a deeply divided nation and only the perceived impartiality 
and fairness of the ICC can avoid politicization of post-conflict justice and hence 
contribute to national reconciliation,233 (ii) where domestic prosecution can worsen the 
volatile security situation. This includes, for instance, prosecution of a powerful leader 
or warlord which could destabilize the government or threaten the resumption or 
worsening of the violence234 and (iii) where, due to limited financial resources and 
                                                 
230 Para. 6 of the Preamble to the ICC Statute, provides that “it is the duty of every state to exercise its 
jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes”.  
231 This is a principle under the Geneva Conventions that obliges a state party which has custody of 
perpetrators of war crimes to try them itself or hand them over to a state that is willing to prosecute (i.e. 
prosecute or extradite). See Werle (2009: 70, marginal no.198). 
232 Informal expert paper, p. 19.  
233 Akhavan (2010: 110). 
234 A real case was the transfer of the trial of Charles Taylor from the seat of the hybrid Special Court for 
Sierra Leone in Freetown to The Hague. 
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complexity of the trial, it is unlikely that the domestic trial will meet international 
standards.235  
 This principle is susceptible to abuse and it can be used by states for revenge by 
referring government’s opponents to the ICC. However, in our case, the right of the 
DRC under the ICC Statute was only to refer the whole situation to the ICC, and had no 
control over it thereafter. The Prosecutor has the discretion to choose which perpetrator 
to prosecute, including possible perpetrators from the rebel groups as well as the agents 
of the government. This reduces the fear of ICC being used as an avenue for settling of 
scores. The ICC itself is aware of this possibility and has cautioned that, admissibility in 
cases of relinquishment of jurisdiction is not automatic and is restricted to prevent such 
possible abuses by states, especially those making self-referrals like the DRC.236  
 From the discussion above, one can conclude that, the ICC’s affirmation of its 
jurisdiction over the DRC cases for inaction sought to fill the impunity gap which would 
have otherwise been created, as unwillingness and inability could not practically 
apply.237 Further, inaction has been acceptable for these two cases as a ground for 
admissibility by analyzing the DRC’s motives rather than its actions.238  
 
4.3  Individual Criminal Responsibility in the DRC Cases 
                                                 
235 Akhavan (2010: 111). 
236 Prosecutor v. Katanga (Interlocutory Appeal Decision), para. 85. The AC clearly pointed out that such 
cases are not automatically admissible. It stated that “the Appeals Chamber is mindful that the Court, 
acting under the relevant provisions of the Statute and depending on the circumstances of each case, may 
decide not to act upon a State’s relinquishment of jurisdiction in favour of the Court”. According to the 
AC, admissibility in this case depends, inter alia, on the fulfillment of the gravity threshold (Article 
17(1)(d), the rule against double jeopardy (Art. 20(3) and Art. 53 of the ICC Statute. The AC’s use of the 
phrase “depending on the circumstances of each case” suggests that even when the Court realizes that the 
state relinquished its jurisdiction not for bona fide reasons, including the intention to avoid its duty to 
prosecute the crimes, the case cannot be admissible for relinquishment of jurisdiction, but it seems it may 
still be admitted if no state with jurisdiction is acting on it (the ‘inaction’ ground). 
237 Benvenuti (2008: 63-65). 
238 Williams and Schabas (2008: marginal no. 22). 
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In confirming the charges in both cases the PTC relied on Article 25(3)(a) of the 
ICC Statute although the charges were drawn in the alternative.239 The article refers to 
commission as a mode of criminal participation to found individual liability. The 
reasons for this are: first, this mode gives rise to principal liability unlike the modes in 
the other articles which entail accessorial liability;240 second, it constitutes the gravest 
form of criminality and may serve as an indicator of the highest degree of 
responsibility;241 and third, principal liability may have more serious implications during 
the sentencing stage.242 For ease of reference the article is reproduced below. 
Article 25(3)  
In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and 
liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that 
person: 
(a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or 
through another person, regardless of whether that other person is 
criminally responsible.  
 
 
 
4.4 PTC’s Interpretation of Article 25(3)(a) 
                                                 
239 Katanga and Chui were charged in the alternative under Art. 25(3)(b) for ordering  the commission of 
the crimes. In both cases the PTC indicated that the charges could also be preferred under Arts. 25(3)(b)-
(d) and Art. 28. See Lubanga Case (Confirmation of Charges) paras. 317-321; and Katanga and Chui 
case (Confirmation of Charges) para. 470. 
240 Lubanga Case (Confirmation of Charges) paras. 320-321; and Katanga and Chui case (Confirmation 
of Charges) para. 471.  
241 Werle (2009: 170, marginal no. 449). 
242 Werle (2009: 170, marginal no. 448). 
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 According to the PTC, the individual responsibility under this article depends 
entirely on the perpetrator’s control over the crime. Once control is established, 
principal liability arises on the side of the controller irrespective of the possibility that he 
or she was not present at the scene of the crime; or did not physically carry out the 
objective elements of the crime; or did not even physically know the physical 
perpetrators.243  
 
4.4.1 Control over the Crime Test 
This test incorporates a combination of some elements of the objective244 and the 
subjective approach245 for distinguishing between principals and accessories to crimes, 
but in principle, it does not take into account such distinction.246 It combines an 
assessment of the facts which enabled the perpetrator to exercise control over the crime 
and the awareness of the facts which led to such control.247 The PTC has identified three 
types of control under article 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute. These are, control over the 
action,248 control over the crime itself and control over the will of those who the commit 
                                                 
243 Lubanga Case (Confirmation of Charges) paras. 330-338; Katanga and Chui Case (Confirmation of 
Charges)  paras. 480 et seq. 
244 According to the objective approach, principals to the crime are only those who physically carry out 
one or more objective elements of the crime, while accessories are those who contributed to the crime in 
any other way. The ICC Statute makes this approach inapplicable by including the notion of commission 
of crime through another person as rising principal liability. See Lubanga Case (Confirmation of Charges) 
paras. 328 and 333 
245 The subjective approach requires that principals to the crime be only those who contribute to the 
commission of the crime with intent to have the crime as their own deed. Those who contribute to its 
commission but without the intent to have the crime as their own become accessories. See Lubanga Case, 
ibid para 329; also see Alosolo (2009: 267-268), footnote 18. Art. 25(3)(d) of the ICC Statute makes this 
approach inapplicable. See Lubanga Case (Conformation of Charges) para. 334.  
246 Lubanga Case (Confirmation of Charges), para. 333. 
247 Lubanga Case (Confirmation of Charges), para. 331; Katanga and Chui Case (Confirmation of 
Charges), para. 484; also see Alosolo (2009: 267). 
248 Control over the action, also called direct commission, entails the situation where the perpetrator 
committed the crime directly/physically/individually. See Lubanga Case (Confirmation of Charges), para. 
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the crime.249 According to the PTC, the DRC cases involved joint control over the 
crimes and the will of the actual perpetrators. Before giving my observation on the 
PTC’s application of the two control tests, we first set out below the tests as interpreted 
by the Chamber.  
 
4.4.1.1 Joint Control over the Crime (Co-perpetration) 
In this scenario, the objective elements of the crime are realized by a joint 
control over the crime by several persons.250 Each of such persons has control only if he 
has the ability to frustrate the commission of the crime by, for instance, not carrying out 
his or her task.251 Six elements of co-perpetration have been  identified by the PTC as 
follows: (i) it involves a plurality of persons,252 (ii) it entails an existence of an express 
or implied agreement in the form of a common plan,253 (iii) each co-perpetrator makes 
an essential contribution in realization of the objective elements of the crime,254 (iv) the 
co- perpetrator commits the specific crime with the knowledge and intent required under 
article 30 of the ICC Statute,255 (v) the co-perpetrators are mutually aware of the result 
of their plan and accept it, so that their individual contributions can be attributed to each 
other,256 and (vi) each co-perpetrator knows the essential nature or implication of his 
                                                                                                                                               
332; Katanga and Chui Case (Confirmation of Charges) para. 488. However, this was not applicable to 
the two DRC cases because the charges were based on joint commission, not individual commission. 
249 Lubanga Case (Confirmation of Charges), para. 332. 
250 Lubanga Case (Confirmation of Charges), para. 332. 
251 Lubanga Case (Confirmation of Charges), para. 342. 
252 Lubanga Case (Confirmation of Charges), para. 343. 
253 Lubanga Case (Confirmation of Charges), paras. 343 and 345. 
254Lubanga Case (Confirmation of Charges), para. 346. This contribution can be done at any stage of the 
plan before or during the execution stage. See Katanga and Chui case (Confirmation of Charges) para. 526 
255 Lubanga Case (Confirmation of charges) paras. 349-367. 
256 Lubanga Case (Confirmation of charges), paras. 361-362. 
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joint control of the plan, that is, by refraining from exercising his task, he has the ability 
to frustrate the commission of the crime.257 
 
4.4.1.2 Control over the Will (Indirect Perpetration) 
This entails the perpetration of the crime(s) through another person,258 in which 
case, the perpetrator does not physically carry out the objective elements of the crime, 
but instead exercises control over its commission by dominating the will of a physical 
perpetrator whom he uses as a tool or instrument.259 It is irrelevant whether the physical 
perpetrator is liable or not. 
 
4.4.1.3 Indirect Co-perpetration 
The PTC has indicated that article 25(3)(a) incorporates yet another form of 
commission which combines the features of co-perpetration and indirect perpetration. It 
is based on the scenario whereby military leaders who have control over different 
organizations, e.g. militia groups in the DRC case, direct their organizations to 
implement a common criminal plan.260 Of particular essence in this scenario is the 
superior-subordinate relationship which is created by the hierarchical structure of the 
organization. The superior must have control over the organization which enables him to 
secure the implementation of his orders to commit a crime by any of his subordinators 
                                                 
257 Lubanga Case (Confirmation of charges), paras. 365-366. 
258 This is also referred to as perpetration by-means or perpetration behind perpetrator. 
259 Lubanga Case (Confirmation of charges), para. 332.. 
260 Katanga and Chui Case (Confirmation of Charges) paras. 540 et seq; also see Alosolo (2009: 269). 
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by way of automatic compliance.261   From the PTC decision, two levels of attributing 
the responsibility can be deduced - horizontal and vertical levels. 
 
 4.4.1.3.1 Horizontal Level of Responsibility 
This arises out of the horizontal relationship between the senior leaders of 
different organizations who set and agreed on the common plan. This makes them 
individually accountable as co-perpetrators if their common plan is implemented.262  
 
4.4.1.3.2 Vertical Level of Responsibility 
This level is two-fold. First it creates individual criminal responsibility to the 
leader (controller) of each organization for the crimes he indirectly commits through his 
own subordinates whom he uses as instruments within his own control. Second, the 
crimes committed by the subordinates of each co-perpetrator in their different 
organizations are mutually attributable to each of them.263 It is irrelevant that none of the 
indirect co-perpetrators, i.e. the commanders, could command obedience from the 
subordinates of the other commander, for implementation of his orders.264 
 
 
                                                 
261 Katanga and Chui case (Confirmation of Charges), para. 519. 
262 This is the fact in the Katanga and Chui case, in which the two accused persons, in their capacity as 
leaders of their different militia groups, are alleged to have set a common plan to jointly attack and wipe 
out Bogoro village. See Katanga and Chui case (Confirmation of Charges) paras. 540 et seq. 
263 Katanga and Chui case (Confirmation of Charges) paras. 519-520. 
264 The PTC ruled that the principle of mutual attribution of the crimes could still be applied although it 
found that there was substantial evidence that FRPI soldiers would obey only orders issued by FRPI 
commanders, and similarly, FNI solders would only obey orders issued by the FNI commanders. See 
Katanga and Chui Case (Confirmation of Charges), para. 560. 
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4.5 Evaluation of PTC’s Interpretation 
One notes that the PTC’s interpretation of the notion of the joint commission 
under article 25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute as applicable to the DRC cases contains some 
novelty.  This novelty does not correspond with the related notion of Joint Criminal 
Enterprise (JCE) used mainly in the ICTY’s jurisprudence which was argued for by 
Katanga.265 Thus, the PTC defied the application of JCE in the DRC cases. This is 
acceptable considering the variations introduced by the ICC Statute which make the two 
notions different.  
First, under the third form of JCE266 the accused person could be held liable even 
if he did not share the specific intent in the crime, provided the crime was naturally 
foreseeable as an incidental consequence of the common plan, and he, nevertheless, took 
the risk.267 In contrast, under article 30 of the ICC Statute each co-perpetrator must 
fulfill all the subjective elements (mens rea) of the crime in his or her own person before 
he can be held criminally liable.268 In relation to a consequence, mere foreseeability is 
not enough: the perpetrator must be aware that such consequence will occur in the 
                                                 
265 Notably, Katanga’s defence objected the interpretation of joint commission under Art. 25(3)(a) to be 
based on control test as fist done in the Lubanga case. He argued that the provision incorporates ICTY’s 
notion of JCE into the ICC Statute and should therefore be interpreted accordingly. See Katanga and Chui 
Case (Confirmation of Charges) para. 474. 
266 The notion of JCE is also based on common purpose/plan to commit a crime by a plurality of persons. 
It comprises three forms, namely, basic form, systemic form and extended form. The basic form entails a 
scenario where two or more people agree on a common criminal plan and each of them executes it with 
mens rea, in which case, they all become liable as perpetrators. Under the systemic form, the perpetrator 
becomes liable if he or she actively participates at any stage of a criminal plan or design which is 
implemented in a systemic way of repression or ill-treatment. It is enough if the perpetrator knew about 
the systemic design and willingly performed his tasks as part of its furtherance. The typical example is so-
called concentration and detention camp cases in Germany where a system of torture and inhumane 
treatment was organized and implemented by the Nazis. The extended form of JCE holds the perpetrator 
criminally liable even for actions that were not within the contemplation of the common plan, provided 
they form a naturally foreseeable consequence of the plan. See Werle (2009: 174-175, marginal nos. 459-
462); also see Cassese (2008: 189 et seq.). 
267 Werle (2009: 175, marginal no. 462); also see Cassese (2008: 199-205). 
268 Werle (2009: 177, marginal no. 471). 
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ordinary course of events.269 Consequently, this third form of JCE is incompatible with 
the ICC Statute.270 Second, JCE distinguishes principal liability from accessorial 
liability on the bases of objective and subjective approaches.271 The argument by 
Katanga’s defence in favour of JCE was, therefore, intended to lower the degree of 
criminal responsibility. This is because if the objective approach of JCE was applied, 
Katanga and Chui could not be held liable as principals since they did not commit the 
crimes physically, but by means of their subordinates. This would be incompatible with 
the third alternative of article 25(3)(a) which establishes principal liability even if the 
perpetrator committed the crime “through another person”.272 Thus the PTC’s decision 
that the jurisprudence of the ICTY in this regard cannot be mechanically transferred to 
the ICC is welcome.273 
However, one may express skepticism on the reasoning of the PTC on the 
principle of indirect co-perpetration in the Katanga and Chui case. Of specific reference 
in this case is the mutual attribution of liability to Katanga and Chui at vertical level, 
thereby making each responsible for crimes committed by the subordinates of the other. 
It should be recalled that, indirect co-perpetration, as the name suggests, encompasses a 
combination of two alternatives of commission as a mode of participation. As a result, it 
is important that the individual elements of each alternative be fulfilled separately before 
“joint commission through another person” is confirmed. In this regard, the PTC’s 
reasoning is not completely flawless. The challenge is set below: 
                                                 
269 ICC Statute, Art. 30(2)(b). This article excludes the applicability of dolus eventualis and recklessness 
as basis of mens rea in respect of consequences of the accused person’s conduct. See Werle (2009: 155, 
marginal no. 413).  
270 Cassese (2008: 212). 
271 See notes 241 and 242 above. 
272 Lubanga case (confirmation of charges) para. 333. 
273 Katanga and Chui Case (Confirmation of charges) para.508. 
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First, as per the PTC’s own formulation, perpetration through another person 
under the ICC Statute entails perpetrator’s “control over the organization”274 of an 
apparatus of power which enables him inter alia to secure the execution of the crime by 
almost automatic compliance of his orders by the subordinates.275 Since the subordinates 
of Katanga and Chui could only comply with orders from their own leaders, then, 
neither of the two commanders could be said to exercise control over the will of the 
subordinates of the other. This diminished the ability of each leader to exercise full 
control over the manner and type of crimes committed by the subordinates of the other. 
Attributing the crimes of subordinates of Katanga to Chui and vice versa is, in my view, 
an overstretching of indirect perpetration under the third alternative of article 25(3)(a).  
Second, the PTC’s interpretation of article 25(3)(a) to incorporate the notion of 
indirect co-perpetration is welcome. However, this, in my view, could exclusively apply 
in situations where the indirect co-perpetrators control the same hierarchical structure, in 
which case each of them would exercise authority over the direct perpetrators. 
Consequently, PTC’s interpretation would not be debatable if both Katanga and Chui 
agreed on their common plan to wipe out Bogoro village, being leaders of the same 
militia group. This is because, in such a case, each would be able to control the will of 
their common subordinates and the application of the PTC’s indirect co-perpetration 
formulation would justifiably apply. 
                                                 
274 Katanga and Chui case (Confirmation of Charges) para. 498. The most common scenario involves the 
control exercised by means of organized hierarchical structure (Organisationsherrschaft in German 
jurisprudence). In such a structure, the superiors are able to exercise control over the conduct of the 
subordinates. Both seniors and subordinates are criminally liable. See Werle (2009: 179, marginal no. 
476).   
275 Katanga and Chui case (Confirmation of Charges) paras. 500-518.  
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There is no doubt the case against Katanga and Chui clearly suited the notion of 
perpetration-by-means.  The disputable part of the PTC’s reasoning as regards vertical 
level of liability would have been solved in two ways: (i) the charges should have been 
confirmed based on indirect perpetration and not indirect co-perpetration. In this case, 
only crimes committed by the subordinates of Katanga and Chui would be attributed to 
them separately. Thus, the Prosecutor would have to apportion the crimes accordingly, 
in which case, for instance, the 200 murders of civilians in Bogoro village would not be 
sought to be attributed to each of them. This, however, might not have been very easy 
for the Prosecutor. He could, however, go for the following second option: (ii) since 
perpetration-by-means in the case of Katanga and Chui involved the scenario of 
superior-subordinate relationship in a military set up, the PTC could, instead of 
overstretching indirect co-perpetration, confirm the charges under article 25(3)(b) for 
ordering the commission of the crimes or under article 28 as responsibility of 
commanders, even though this would lower the degree of criminal responsibility.276   
At this stage suffices it to say that some aspects of the concept of indirect co-
perpetration as applied specifically to the Katanga and Chui case are likely to be 
contestable issues at the trial or appeal stage (if any). Whether the PTC’s interpretation 
will be upheld in the future cases also remains to be seen. 
 
 
                                                 
276 It should be noted that, even the Prosecutor had preferred the charges under article 25(3)(a) and in the 
alternative under article 25(3)(b) or 28. The PTC acknowledged that the charged could be also confirmed 
under these two articles. It noted, however, that article 25(3)(a) entails principal liability while the others-
25(3)(b) to (d) and 28 entail only accessorial liability. As a result, confirmation of charges under article 
25(3)(a) renders the others moot because article 25(3)(a) involves the highest degree of criminal 
responsibility under the ICC Statute. See Katanga Case (Confirmation of Charges) para.4721; also see 
Werle (2009: 178, marginal no. 474). 
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4.6 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter critically discussed two legal issues arising from the PTC decision 
on the DRC cases. The first issue is the admissibility of the cases. In this regard, it has 
been argued that such admissibility was, as a matter of principle, dependent on the 
fulfillment of the complementarity principle. As it has been shown, the DRC cases were 
admissible for ‘inaction’ as a ground additional to unwillingness and inability to 
prosecute provided for under article 17 of the ICC Statute. The issue has been concluded 
that admissibility on this ground has not violated the principle of complementarity and 
was a good cause in the fight against impunity.  The second legal issue addressed is 
commission as a mode of criminal participation in crime. In this regard, it has been 
asserted that under the ICC Statute, the perpetrator’s mode of participation is determined 
by his control over the crime and not by subjective or objective tests. The interpretation 
of article 25(3)(a) by the PTC has been welcomed, although the author has expressed 
some reservation to some aspects of the notion of vertical mutual attribution of liability 
in the circumstances specific to Katanga and Chui case. In the following chapter the 
study highlights, among other things, the importance of the DRC cases in the ICC’s 
jurisprudence. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 Lessons from the DRC Cases  
 Like the landmark IMT judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal in 1946, the two 
decisions in the two DRC cases have their own significance and a history to make. 
Notwithstanding the preliminary nature of the proceedings from which they emanate, 
the two decisions are an indication that the ICC has started to develop its own 
jurisprudence which is independent from that of the predecessor ad hoc Tribunals. This 
jurisprudence will mostly be shaped by the interpretation of the ICC Statute and not the 
international customary law or a mechanical transfer of judicial precedents from the ad 
hoc Tribunals. In this regard, this study has identified some novelty in the first two cases 
at ICC. First, in the DRC cases, the ICC has applied the principle of perpetration-by-
means which is a new in international law.277 Second, the notion of joint commission 
under the ICC is similar but not the same as that of joint criminal enterprise which 
features most prominently in the jurisprudence of the ICTY. Third, principal liability 
under the ICC Statute is determined exclusively by the control of the crime test and not 
by the objective or subjective test adopted by the ICTY. In this regard, the PTC leaves 
no doubt as to the willingness of the ICC to explore its own path to develop its own 
                                                 
277 According to Werle (2009: 169, marginal no. 447), the concept of perpetration-by means has no direct 
basis in customary international law. Its inclusion in the ICC Statute and its application on the DRC cases 
is, therefore, a new development. 
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jurisprudence.278 The path to ICC’s own jurisprudence has, therefore, started with the 
two DRC cases, and will definitely continue to shape subsequent cases.279 
 
5.2 Conclusions 
5.2.1  The DRC Conflict 
 The study reveals that the conflict in the DRC is multi-dimensional based on 
leadership history, ethnicity, greed and external influence. This has led the attempts to 
end the conflict through several methods such as political agreements, passing of 
amnesty laws and interference of international and regional stakeholders. Despite all 
these efforts, the conflict which started in 1996 still exists to date in the eastern part of 
the country. The civilian population has fallen victim of grave war crimes and crimes 
against humanity which the DRC has not been able to stop or punish.  
 
5.2.2  ICC’s Intervention in the DRC  
The intervention of the ICC in the DRC conflict is a timely response to the serious 
violation of international criminal law. It is meant to achieve the spirit of the states 
parties to the Rome Statute to put an end to the impunity which persists in the DRC. 
However, this intervention is not sufficient in its own to adequately address the 
impunity. This is due to its limitedness in terms of jurisdiction. ICC’s jurisdiction over 
the DRC situation is limited by time, such that it can be exercised only over the crimes 
                                                 
278 Weigend (2008: 478). 
279 At first, the Lubanga decision shaped the Katanga and Chui decision on the question of modes of 
participation. N.B. the notion of ‘inaction’ as a basis of admissibility has been used by the PTC in 
subsequent cases. See note 213 above. 
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committed after 1 July 2002.280 As a result, crimes committed during the first and 
second Congo wars fall outside the mandate of the ICC. 
 
5.2.3 Complementarity    
As the study shows, complementarity demands that primary jurisdiction of 
prosecuting and punishing international crimes committed in the DRC be left to 
domestic jurisdictions. The ICC can only have a secondary jurisdiction as the court of 
last resort when it is established that the domestic jurisdictions cannot fulfill this 
obligation. On this basis, the ICC is not meant to replace but to supplement the 
obligation of states in the fight against impunity. The study shows that, the principle of 
complementarity must, therefore, be interpreted in a manner which is consistent with the 
spirit of the Rome Statute i.e. to ensure that crimes against international law do not go 
unpunished. Consequently, this principle should not be used as an escape route by 
perpetrators of international crimes by confining it to the interpretation of 
“unwillingness” and “inability” under article 17 of the ICC Statute. When it is evident 
that such crimes have been committed and no state is actively prosecuting them 
(“inaction”), the prosecution by the ICC will be justified and will not violate the 
principle of complementarity. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
280 ICC Statute, Art.126. This is also referred to as limitation of jurisdiction ratione temporis of the ICC; 
also see Werle (2009: 86, marginal no. 238).  
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5.2.4 Modes of Participation  
The study also addressed commission as a mode of criminal participation under 
the ICC Statute. In doing so, the study confined itself to the reasoning adopted by the 
PTC when confirming the charges against Lubanga, Katanga and Chui as regards 
perpetration and indirect perpetration. It has been indicated that, this is the preliminary 
position taken by the ICC at the pre-trial stage.281 Much of its formulation is welcome, 
although the author has expressed skepticism about the PTC’s innovation on vertical 
attribution of liability in the specific circumstances of the Katanga and Chui case.  
 
5.3 Recommendations 
5.3.1 Retributive Justice 
 It is clear that due to jurisdictional limitations, the ICC cannot prosecute 
perpetrators who committed crimes in the DRC prior to 1 July 2002. However, the 
violation of international criminal law committed prior to this date should not go 
unpunished. Apparently, the international law crimes under the ICC Statute are not 
completely a new invention.  Most of them constituted codified crimes under customary 
international law before the ICC Statute was adopted.282 They are, on this ground, 
prosecutable under the principle of universal jurisdiction or that of aut dedere aut 
judicare. The principle of legality283 is not an obstacle to grounding criminality in 
                                                 
281 The ICC’s final position on this matter will be known when the Trial Chamber issues its final decisions 
of the cases and any decisions on appeals (if any) by the Appeals Chamber. 
282 E.g. the Geneva Convention (IV) of 12 August 1949 and the additional Protocols to the Geneva 
Conventions of 8 June 1977 had already codified customary international law of war crimes into 
international treaty law. See Werle (2009: 14, marginal no. 42).    
283 Notably, the principle itself is a part of customary law. According to it, no crime can be punished or 
sanction imposed unless, at the time of commission of the crime, the conduct entailed was criminal and 
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customary law.284 It is, therefore, recommended to third states to proceed on these bases 
and exercise their right and obligation to prosecute crimes under international law. This 
will make it possible for other perpetrators from outside the DRC to account for their 
crimes committed on the territory of the DRC. The ICC does not intend to prosecute all 
the perpetrators of crimes in the DRC. Its strategy and ability is to prosecute a few 
perpetrators who bear the most responsibility for the crimes.285 Therefore, the DRC must 
conduct domestic prosecutions against those who bear lower responsibility based on its 
domestic laws. This is important as it will fill the impunity gap which is left by the ICC 
strategy. 
 
5.3.2 Restorative Justice 
Apart from domestic and international prosecutions, the DRC has other options of 
dealing with its past. Notably, the experience from other similar conflicts shows that a 
criminal justice strategy alone cannot address such a looming impunity gap as the one in 
the DRC. In Sierra Leone, for instance, the parallel existence of an international criminal 
justice mechanism, the Special Court of Sierra Leone and the Sierra Leone TRC proved 
to be effective options in addressing post-conflict justice.286 A similar option was 
adopted by post-apartheid South Africa which embarked on the reconciliation process 
through a TRC to which prosecutions, conditional amnesties and reparations were 
                                                                                                                                               
the sanction had been prescribed by an existing law (nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege). See 
Werle (2009: 37, marginal no. 104). 
284 Werle (2009: 51, marginal no. 141). 
285 See the Policy Paper, p. 3. 
286 Schabas (2001: 21 et seq.). 
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tied.287 Besides prosecutions, justice demands that victims of the crimes in the DRC 
have the right to know the truth about what happened and, where possible, be 
compensated for their suffering.288 On this ground, it is recommended that the DRC 
authorities reconsider the use of restorative justice mechanisms. These would include 
establishment of another fully mandated TRC and special schemes for reparations to the 
victims of the conflict. Such efforts will supplement ICC’s work on the DRC and ensure 
that neither justice nor peace is compromised.  
 
(20,450 words) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
287 Werle (1996: 58 et seq.). For a detailed discussion on the relationship between restrorative and 
retributive justice see Yav Kashtung (2005: 1 et seq.). 
288 Adjami and Mushiata (2005: 6).  
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